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Chapter I: Introduction 
In 2017, the leaders of rural movements from Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Niger, Mali, 
Senegal, and Ghana converged in Spain’s Basque region at the annual conference of La Vía 
Campesina, a prominent international peasant organization.1 The activists discussed their 
campaigns to defend the rights and resources of small farmers in the face of governments 
pursuing agro-industrial development projects and the reallocation of sizeable tracts of land to 
corporate entities. The representatives were indicative of an increasingly common form of 
African peasant politics, namely organized social movements. In this vein, the considerable 
presence of African peasant associations at the conference raises questions about small farmers, 
some 60% of the sub-Saharan population,2 as political actors on the continent. While esteemed 
Africanists and scholars of peasant politics have highlighted the obstacles to collective action for 
small farmers, the emergence of more and more peasant movements across Africa shows that 
new investigations of peasant collective action are needed. What causes peasants to choose 
collective action when making political claims? Where do peasant movements emerge? When do 
they engage broad-based and diverse rural populations? These are the questions from which this 
study departs. 
I have tried to illuminate the political activities of small farmers in Africa by testing a 
hypothesis holding, in essence, that state intervention in agrarian economies causes peasant 
movements to engage in broad-based contention, on regional and national levels. The study 
traces the connections between government land and agricultural institutions and the 
                                                 
1 La Vía Campesina, “African peasants highlight their struggles at La Vía Campesina global conference,” July 21, 
2017. Accessed April 24, 2019: https://viacampesina.org/en/african-peasants-highlight-struggles-via-campesina-
global-conference/ 




characteristics of rural movements that make claims on them. Case studies of regions of 
Tanzania, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ethiopia show the ways in which rural movements are 
constructed in response to the political and social environments in which they arise. That is, the 
comparisons demonstrate that the character of political authority and social organization are 
important determinants of the form taken by peasant movements.  
Starting from my hypothesis, I construct an argument as to how statist land tenure and 
agricultural systems interact with social structures to cause peasants to adopt ethnically inclusive 
political identities and scaled-up contestation strategies, terms which I define below. The study 
shows that the systems used to govern rural resources and the social organization of rural groups 
profoundly influence the essential characteristics of peasant movements. In this sense, the study 
investigates two independent variables, one that is intrinsic to the nation-state and one that is 
intrinsic to rural societies, in order to explain the political activities of small farmers in Africa. 
Since 60% of the sub-Saharan population in 2017 lived in rural areas, 3 the institutions which 
govern land and agriculture - the bases of economic activity for that sizeable population - are 
critical to understanding African politics and development.  
The case study comparisons made here shed light on an under-analyzed and under-
theorized dynamic of peasant-state relations in Africa: the conditions (1) under which peasant 
political action reaches up to directly challenge the highest levels of national authority and (2) 
under which narrow ethnic identities are supplanted by more encompassing ones. I show over the 
course of this essay that such outcomes depend on the interaction between modernizing state-
managed rural economic institutions and the structure of the traditional agrarian societies that 
encounter them. Building off of the work of Catherine Boone on land tenure systems, this paper 
                                                 




presents evidence for a theory of the scaling-up and broadening of African peasant political 
activity. The cases are of confrontation, ranging from concerted electoral challenges to armed 
rebellion, between rural groups and national authority.  
Terminology 
Before introducing the hypothesis and theoretical framework, it is necessary to define the 
key terms used throughout the study. I define a “land tenure regime” as the set of formal and 
informal institutions and laws that govern land and are used to resolve conflicts over it. In a 
strictly legal sense, these systems are distinguished as either statist or neo-customary, to use 
Boone’s categories. Statist land tenure regimes are governed by secular agents of the state, 
ordinary bureaucrats, sometimes with the help and oversight of locally elected representatives, 
and are therefore referred to as a form of direct rule over land. Neo-customary land tenure 
regimes invest power in chiefs and other traditional authorities to govern land access. I consider 
these to be a form of indirect rule over land, in the sense that intermediaries, wielding some 
degree of personally specific authority, are used by the central state to govern in its place. 4 In 
theory, the two types of land tenure regimes produce different “political effects,” another term 
used frequently here which simply refers to a manifestation of political activity. For simplicity, I 
also use “outcomes” interchangeably with “political effects” throughout the essay. The two 
political effects with which this study is primarily concerned are the “political identity” and 
“contestation strategy” of peasants. Political identity is the identity an individual or group uses to 
give coherence and rhetorical weight to political claims. Political identity may take ethnic, 
regional, and/or national forms, for example. Contestation strategies are the tactics used to make 
those claims. In the arena of land politics, they range from lobbying a local leader individually 
                                                 
4 Catherine Boone and Lydia Nyeme, “Land Institutions and Political Ethnicity in Africa: Evidence from Tanzania,” 
Comparative Politics 48, no. 1 (2015), 69-70. 
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for more land to mobilizing across villages and jurisdictions to pressure the state for changes to 
the way land is allocated. Relating these terms, Boone argues that neo-customary systems 
accentuate ethnic political identities and village-level contestation and that statist regimes foster 
non-ethnic, modern political identities and regional and national forms of contestation.5 
Finally, the analyses of the effect of group social structure on peasant movements 
frequently use the descriptors “hierarchical” and “egalitarian.” By a hierarchical society, I mean 
one that is characterized by social differentiation and inequality, with leaders that control subject 
populations. I also describe hierarchical societies as being “centralized,” or having some degree 
of concentrated political power in particular leaders or institutions, such as organized religious 
orders. Egalitarian societies, which are referred to as “decentralized,” do not have leaders who 
dominate or control other community members and have a more equal organization of society. 
They are called decentralized for the lack of prominent leaders and institutions wielding power 
over the collective. Government in egalitarian societies may be communal and/or loosely 
constructed. I also use the term “acephalous” to refer to egalitarian groups. 
Question 
Far more land in sub-Saharan Africa is governed under neo-customary regimes than 
under statist ones and prominent works such as Mamdani’s Citizen and Subject and Lund’s Local 
Politics and the Dynamics of Property in Africa have analyzed rural politics under the former. 
Moreover, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania by Hyden, The State in Africa by Bayart, and No 
Condition is Permanent by Berry have examined the day-to-day tactics used by individual and 
small groups of peasants to defend themselves against and negotiate with overbearing states. 
While these contributions and others have covered the most common forms of African peasant 
                                                 
5 Boone and Nyeme, “Land Institutions and Political Ethnicity in Africa,” 69-70. 
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politics and land institutions, analyses of collective peasant movements and statist land tenure 
systems are both lacking. Though it is more common for peasants to “avoid the state by taking 
refuge in alternatives that are clearly second best,”6 I have focused on cases of organized 
collective action to better understand when peasants seek to make a systemic impact and are not 
limited by “second best” tactics. 
 To fill this knowledge gap, I have attempted to answer the following: Under what 
conditions do ethnically diverse groups of peasants join collectively to challenge and assert 
claims on the central state? The analytic emphasis throughout this study is thus on explaining 
the form that peasant political activity takes, though I have taken care to explain the processes 
leading to mobilization in each of the core cases. By analyzing episodes of broad-based and 
scaled-up peasant contention in Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ethiopia, I defend my argument that 
state involvement in land allocation and agriculture interacts with group social structure to 
influence the forms of peasant collective action, in what I believe is a theoretical contribution to 
the study of African peasant and land politics. 
Hypothesis 
The hypothetical framework set forth here draws on Boone’s theory of the political 
incentives of statist or direct rule land tenure regimes, which I elaborate on below, and augments 
it by explaining the effect of the social structure of agrarian groups on outcomes for peasant 
political activity. Following Boone, direct rule of land and agriculture incentivizes peasants (1) 
to assert their claims on a regional and national scale, through collective action and in institutions 
above the level of the village and (2) to adopt political identities that are more inclusive than 
ethnicity. The first outcome should occur because direct rule of the rural economy leads 
                                                 
6 Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 87. 
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contentious peasants to pressure the state as the authority over land and agricultural resources, 
making mass-mobilization and collective action useful strategies for waging rural political 
claims. Since the state is the target to which land and agricultural claims must be directed, 
movements will seek to exert pressure on it. Aggrieved peasants therefore have a reason to form 
wide-ranging, noisy protest movements and to pursue claims in higher-level arenas, such as 
courts and elections. The second outcome predicted by the hypothesis is based on reasoning that 
direct rule of land, by secular agents of the state, disregards ethnic claims to land. In contrast to 
traditional leaders that allocate land according to group-insider status, keeping the resource to 
members of the ethnic group and the traditional community, statist institutions de-emphasize 
ethnicity when distributing land. The absence of an ethnic basis for land claims pushes peasants 
to adopt political identities that are more salient and that can be used to unify ethnically diverse 
movements to contest the state’s management of land.  
This institutional theory of the political effects of statist land tenure systems is, however, 
incomplete. It explains how statist institutions cause peasant movements to adopt encompassing 
political identities and to challenge state power, but it falls short in explaining where such 
institutions take hold in emerging states. A predictive understanding of peasant movements then 
requires an understanding of the patterns of state-building; knowing where strong statist 
institutions are likely to develop, one can in turn better predict where broad-based peasant 
movements are likely to occur. To this end, I seek to deepen the explanatory power of Boone’s 
institutional theory of peasant movements by synthesizing it with a focus on the social 
underpinnings of African state-building.  
A more complete theory should account for the way in which the presence or absence of 
powerful local leaders, sitting atop a social hierarchy, influence the extension of the state’s 
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authority and its relationship with rural populations. Because the social characteristics of rural 
groups, such as their degree of centralization and historical inequality, shape the penetration of 
statist rural institutions, they ultimately shape outcomes for peasant politics. Imposing statist 
institutions is a challenging task for budding governments, made all the more difficult when done 
in the face of jealous and powerful regional leaders. The extent to which the state operates in 
practice as the authority over land is contingent on the existence of local, traditional leaders 
whose own authority may rival that of the state. Prominent local leaders are likely to become 
mediators between nascent or weak bureaucracies, looking to consolidate order with the help of 
influential locals, and rural populations. In mediating between their peasant clients and the state, 
local leaders directly shape the way in which developing state policies and resources are 
respectively implemented and allocated. Ingratiating themselves with the state in turn helps local 
leaders to maintain their own authority and to displace the state as the target of claims.  
It is on these grounds that I argue that the social structure of a rural group is 
determinative of the forms of peasant political activity that emerge to make claims under statist 
land tenure systems. Where powerful local leaders are able to mediate between rural populations 
and the state and to assume powers over agricultural resource allocation, peasants belonging to 
hierarchical groups are likely to direct their claims to these figures, meaning that contestation 
will not scale up to put pressure on the state and that ethnic identities will continue to be 
meaningful in land and agricultural claims. Moreover, traditional leaders are often able to 
suppress peasants from joining together by relying on forbidding institutions, social norms, and 
ideologies that justify the docility of subjects. The ability of local leaders to control their subjects 
makes them a generally attractive ally for states seeking to consolidate their authority and 
12 
 
therefore hierarchical groups are more likely to be given compensatory access to the state’s 
political and economic resources.  
To develop a theoretical framework of labelled outcomes, we expect the containment of 
contestation, meaning that local leaders either suppress peasant collective action or remain the 
target of claims, when hierarchical societies encounter statist rural economic regimes. Just as 
contention should not broaden its scope under such circumstances, political identities will 
continue to be narrow or ethnically exclusive as well. Ethnicity and communal belonging should 
remain a salient force for peasants seeking to sway traditional leaders who mediate conflicts over 
land and agriculture on behalf of the state. 
While hierarchical groups are more readily incorporated into the state’s political-
economic order, egalitarian or acephalous groups, lacking intermediaries, are unlikely to 
command the organizational force to do so. Unconstrained by powerful regional challengers, 
state-builders can more easily impose statist land and agricultural systems directly on the 
countryside. As a result, there is a much higher likelihood of close contact between the state and 
the rural population. In a statist institutional environment, peasants must pressure the state 
directly when grievances arise, instead of appealing to local notables. To this end, egalitarian 
groups use contestation strategies that go beyond local boundaries to target regional and national 
authorities. We expect to see the upscaling of contestation when a fragmented, decentralized 
group mobilizes to make claims on a statist regime. With contention transcending the boundaries 
of ethnic communities, political identities will also become ethnically inclusive, grouping 
together diverse claimants and taking on regionalist or nationalist forms. These outcomes are 













Figure 1 is intended to serve as an organizing schematic for peasant political outcomes. It 
visualizes the interaction between modernizing statist land and agricultural regimes and rural 
societies. The framework is based on the arguments made here that centralized/hierarchical and 
decentralized/egalitarian societies differ in their capacity to shield their populations from the 
reach of modern states. Leaders of hierarchical societies are better able to ally themselves with 
state elites and are consequently better able to shape the effects of state penetration, which 
directly impacts peasant political outcomes. The result of this process is a characteristic 
compromise of African state-building, in which local leaders retain status and authority in 
exchange for allegiance to the central state and acceptance of its political-economic order. As 
traditional authorities mediate between the state and their peasant subjects, the politics of the 
latter continue to adhere to traditional forms. On the other hand, egalitarian groups are in general 
unable to initially counteract the imposition of statist institutions; African state-builders usually 
meet less concerted resistance from decentralized groups than from centralized ones, enabling 
them to construct institutions with direct control over land allocation and agriculture. The 
political activity of peasants then will correspondingly target the higher-level, delocalized, and 
Statist Rural Economic Regime 
Hierarchical/Centralized Group Egalitarian/Decentralized Group 
Given conditions for 
mobilization 
- Containment of contestation 
- Ethnically exclusive political 
identities 
 
- Upscaling of contestation 
- Ethnically inclusive political 
identities 




de-ethnicized governments they seek to challenge in moments of contention. The framework, 
therefore, highlights the socio-political factors, captured in the hierarchy/centralization – 
equality/decentralization variable, which determine state penetration. Once the degree of state 
penetration is ascertained, one can make more accurate predictions about the characteristics of 
peasant movements. In this way, the framework provides a fuller account of where high-level, 
multiethnic peasant movements are likely to emerge, with greater explanatory capacity than a 
purely institutional model. 
The framework in Figure 1, however, can only partly explain the characteristics of 
peasant contention. It lays the foundation for more in depth explanations for the scope and 
inclusivity of peasant movements, which must be developed from analyses of specific 
configurations of state and traditional power. Between variations in statist rural regimes and in 
the degree of centralization or fragmentation, such configurations cannot be reduced to a single 
schematic. In this sense, the framework can be used to guide individual analyses of the interplay 
between nationalizing states and localizing traditional orders and to inform predictions about 
how that interplay will impact on the characteristics of peasant politics. The framework provides 
predictive guidelines for analysts to construct country- and region-specific predictions about the 
potential form of rural movements. The case studies analyzed here conform generally to the 
framework, while also demonstrating the complexity of interactions between the key statist 
regime and group hierarchy variables.  
Explaining the Mobilization of Peasants 
Though this paper primarily makes an argument as to what form peasant movements 
take, each case study also analyzes the conditions that led peasants to engage in contentious 
political activity in the first place. To organize these analyses, I have relied on the social 
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movement framework in Dynamics of Contention by Doug McAdam, Sydney Tarrow, and 
Charles Tilly.7 While their work covers the full trajectory of social movements, I have used their 
model of the initial mobilization process to augment the case studies. Their framework conforms 
to the standard or “classical” social movement model, but aims to exchange a static conception 
of mobilization for one emphasizing more dynamic interaction between actors. They modify the 
classic terminology to reflect the dynamism they hope to introduce into theoretical models of 
social movements, for example, exchanging the more determined “opportunity structure” for the 
more uncertain process of “attribution of opportunity and threat.”  
Following McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, mobilization begins to emerge when social 
change processes produce threats to and political opportunities for contentious actors. Groups 
that have perceived threats and political opportunities are primed to initiate and respond to 
mobilization efforts. Within a newly contestable political environment, actors tap into social 
networks, in what they refer to as social appropriation, to organize those politically enlivened 
group members who have encountered threats and/or opportunities. Whether through existing or 
newly created associations, actors rely on connections to the broader community to bring new 
members into action. From these organizational sites, groups plan and undertake collective 
actions, such as mass protests, boycotts, and land occupations. In the descriptive sections of the 
case studies, I explain the emergence of rural movements using these concepts. 
Historical Context: The Evolution of Land Tenure Laws in Africa 
 Before analyzing the effect of the state’s control of land on peasant politics, it is 
necessary to prepare by reviewing the history of land governance in post-colonial Africa. While 
there is considerable cross- (and intra-) country variation in land tenure regimes, it is possible to 
                                                 
7 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 38-50. 
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identify regional trends, stemming from colonial experiences, in their legal form. In emphasizing 
trends in the legal or formal aspects of land tenure regimes, I intend to make clear that these 
aspects, despite regional similarities, often contradict the actual authorities and institutions that 
govern access to land. While statist laws tended to be popular at independence, they were often 
obstructed or coopted by traditional authorities, which meant that in practice neo-customary 
regimes were used to govern far more land than statist ones.8 Beginning in the 1990s with 
democratization and the adoption of neoliberal structural adjustment programs, there emerges a 
continent-wide, donor-driven shift in land laws towards privatization that continues to this day. 
Against these top-down efforts, simultaneous decentralization processes stymied the shift to 
privatization while other actors have advocated for reforms that prioritize use rights of small-
holders or communal rights. 
 Throughout Francophone West Africa, most newly independent states formally 
established systems of direct rule of land, seeking to carry over modified versions of the colonial 
system of land tenure.9 The extensive prerogatives over land of the colonial state, in this region 
of former extractive colonies, were appealing to new elites with developmental and or selfish 
objectives. The continued use of a domaine national from the colonial period meant that the state 
would be the ultimate owner of the vast majority of lands, with prerogatives over allocation.10 
More specifically, the use of a “leasehold” system, in which an occupant must satisfy 
requirements of economic development or mise en valeur in order to receive a revocable and 
conditional title to land, persisted in many former French colonies and the Democratic Republic 
                                                 
8 In 2007, Boone wrote “Over 80 percent of all arable land in sub-Saharan Africa is currently held under some form 
of ‘customary’ or non-statutory tenure.” 
Catherine Boone, “Property and Constitutional Order: Land Tenure Reform and the Future of the African State,” 
African Affairs 106, no. 425 (2007): 11. 
9 John Bruce et al., Country Profiles of Land Tenure: Africa 1996, Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin – 
Madison, 1998: 8. 
10 Sara Berry, “Struggles Over Land and Authority in Africa,” African Studies Review 60, no. 3 (2017), 108. 
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of Congo (DRC), which was a Belgian colony. Such mise en valeur requirements were, in 
theory, a means to solidify the state’s decision-making power over land; local committees or 
administrators sent by the center would assess the productivity of landholders and reallocate land 
in cases where standards of use were unmet. Guinea, DRC, Republic of Congo, Benin, Senegal, 
Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, to name a few examples, saw “nationalization, partial nationalization, 
or some variation on this theme”11 in their first decades of independence. 
Despite statist laws, traditional authorities continued to play a significant role in land 
allocation decisions in these nations and throughout West Africa, either as a result of political 
strategies for incorporating the periphery (which meant applying statist laws according to the 
interests of coopted local authorities) or state weakness. Thus, in 1996 Bruce wrote that, “in all 
West African Countries, whether officially recognized or not, community-based [neo-customary, 
in the terms of this study] tenure systems predominantly dictate who has access to land and 
natural resources.”12 Such a state of affairs indicates the relevant distinction between de jure and 
de facto land tenure systems as well as a certain degree of “legal pluralism,” often decried by 
legalistic development experts as being inimical to the formation of stable land markets and rural 
modernization.  
Exceptions to the general trend of statist land tenure laws in West Africa are Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana, and Guinea Bissau, countries that were not part of French West 
Africa and where neo-customary land tenure regimes were enshrined in law on at least a regional 
level.13 In these countries, the state expressly acknowledged the authority of chiefs in limited 
areas to allocate land and resolve conflicts. 
                                                 
11 Bruce et al., Country Profiles of Land Tenure: Africa 1996, 5. 
12 Ibid., 8. 
13 Bruce et al., Country Profiles of Land Tenure: Africa 1996, 11. 
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 Shifting our geographic focus, land tenure laws in the former colonies of East and 
southern Africa, many with a history of settler colonization, differ from those of West Africa in 
that they provide for privatization or full individual ownership of land. Consequently, higher 
percentages of land are privately owned than in West African states.14 Nevertheless, statist land 
laws are prevalent as well; in reaction to the presence of white settlers, “redistributive land 
reform came hard on the heels of independence. In Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola, where 
most land had been in the name of the state under the colonial concession regime, the new 
governments retained state ownership and opted for socialist reform models, seeking to replace 
household farming with village collectives or state farms.”15 Similarly, although not directly after 
independence, “in Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Namibia, land reform has meant the subdivision and 
reassignment of what were either freehold or long-term leasehold white farms into smaller 
holdings for resettlement by Africans, usually retained in state ownership and allocated to the 
new holders on permits or leaseholds.”16 Even in this context of statist reforms and 
nationalizations, it is important to keep in mind the coexistence of unofficial, de facto neo-
customary land tenure regimes in this region as well. 
 These regional trends in post-independence land laws reveal the effect of colonial 
experiences on the governance of land. In West Africa, the maintenance of colonial laws would 
formally maintain a strong role for the state, yet, as will be shown in the case of the groundnut 
basin of Senegal, such statist powers could actually often reinforce the authority of rural elites. 
On the other hand, former British colonies in this region gave legal backing to neo-customary 
                                                 
14 In 2003, 41 percent of land was privately owned in Zimbabwe, 44 percent in Namibia, and 72 percent in South 
Africa, compared with 5 percent in Senegal and 2 percent in Côte d’Ivoire and Cameroon. Boone, Property and 
Political Order in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 24. 
15 Bruce et al., Country Profiles of Land Tenure: Africa 1996, 202. 
16 Ibid., 202. 
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land tenure regimes, in line with the practices of colonial administrators. In East and southern 
Africa, redistributive reforms went hand in hand with the direct rule of land while private 
ownership of land is also relatively more common, both of which are tendencies stemming from 
settler colony histories. Finally, while statist land tenure laws tended to be popular across the 
continent in the decades after independence, the visions of such laws were rarely realized as neo-
customary systems governed much more land than statist ones. 
 Shifting forward in time to the 1990s, international aid agencies began providing an 
impetus for land law reforms, with a focus on securing private ownership rights. As African 
governments agreed to structural adjustment programs to finance debts owed to international 
creditors, donor agencies “had concluded that market reforms would not be effective unless 
property rights were clearly defined and consistently enforced.”17 In conjunction with policies of 
market liberalization and state retrenchment, many governments initiated land law reforms by 
establishing or revitalizing national registries for land, attempting to provide a greater degree of 
tenure security that was supposed to facilitate investment and economic growth.18 
Simultaneously, donor funding for land law reforms and policy documents on the subject 
increased greatly, making it all the more feasible and attractive for governments to undertake 
reform processes.19 Between 1992 and 2006, land law reforms were undertaken in Tanzania, 
Uganda, Rwanda, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Malawi, Mozambique, and Botswana, 
to name a few cases.20  
Just as statist land laws were mostly thwarted or obstructed by rural elites in the first 
decades of independence, decentralization processes in the 1990s raised countervailing forces 
                                                 
17 Berry, “Struggles Over Land and Authority in Africa,” 106. 
18 Ibid., 110. 
19 Ambreena Manji, The Politics of Land Reform in Africa (London: Zed Books, 2006), 56-57. 
20 Boone, “Property and Constitutional Order,” 569. 
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that worked against donors’ top-down efforts at formalization of tenure. 21 As struggling 
governments sought to address challenges of legitimacy and to improve governance through 
decentralization strategies,22 more and more prerogatives over land were shifted towards 
traditional rural leaders. These processes diverted attention away from formalization of tenure 
laws, as rural authorities were further empowered to uphold the traditional land relations that are 
in many areas the foundation of their authority. For example, decentralization reforms in 
Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger and Côte d’Ivoire “bolster[ed] historical and communal rights that 
circumscribe market forces.”23 Decentralization’s effects call to mind that land laws must be 
considered within the social context in which they are implemented and have rarely led to new 
land tenure regimes in a straightforward manner. 
Today, many countries continue to recalibrate their land tenure systems through national 
dialogues and further elaboration of new laws, as pressures on land mount from population 
growth, urbanization, and global warming and liberalizations clear the way for large-scale land 
grabs. With the World Bank pressing for privatization reforms, other actor have raised their 
voices in national reform discussions to advocate for the securitization of user rights, which 
would give small farmers security over the land they use, or for greater communal rights over 
land, allowing communities to manage land for themselves.24  
A Preliminary Case: Direct Rule of Land in Tanzania 
 
Having laid out the broader historical trends in land governance across Africa, the study 
will now begin constructing the argument regarding the political effects produced by statist land 
                                                 
21Boone, “Property and Constitutional Order,” 574. 
22 Tyler Dickovick and James Wunsch, eds., Decentralization in Africa: The Paradox of State Strength (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014), 5. 
23 Boone, “Property and Constitutional Order,” 574. 
24 Ibid., 571-576. 
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tenure regimes. This subsection provides an in-depth summary of Boone’s Tanzania case study 
in which she argues that the political identities and contestation strategies of rural populations are 
shaped by the country’s statist land tenure regime. With respect to political identities, the 
subsection outlines the argument that direct rule of land in Tanzania has contributed to the 
emergence in rural areas of a nationalist political identity based on Tanzanian heritage and the 
diminution of narrower ethnic political identities. It shows that, in seeking to appeal to state land 
bureaucrats in moments of conflict, peasants adopt discourses of the state, which are based on 
nationalist ideologies. It also examines the scaled-up institutions and strategies which peasants 
use to assert or challenge claims to land, such as regional protest and elections. By outlining 
Boone’s case, I aim to clarify the hypothesis’ predictions about how direct rule influences rural 
forms of political contestation and the identities that motivate it. What Boone does not cover, 
however, are the social dynamics that shape peasant politics, which I analyze in the main 
chapters. 
Boone’s case study provides empirical data on the forms of political action and identity 
that arise under Tanzania’s statist tenure regime. She conducted fieldwork in the neighboring 
Babati, Hanang, and Mbulu districts, located in north-central Tanzania, regions where land 
scarcity is high and conflicts over it are prevalent. The research covers six instances of land 
conflict, the first of which occurred in the Kiru Valley of Babati District. In the 1990s, following 
the failure of agricultural projects on land leased by the government to private corporations, large 
tracts were vacated by the lessees. Many indigenous small-farmers began working the newly 
unoccupied lands, without legal permission to do so. The government tacitly allowed the 
squatters to remain on the land, simply ignoring them. Subsequent decisions by the government 
to lease the land to private investors, many of which were Tanzanian citizens of Asian descent, 
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has stoked conflict in a territory where land is scarce and where peasant families are expanding. 
The ensuing struggles over who should have the right to work the land reveals much about the 
specific effect of direct rule on political contestation and identity.  
The rhetoric of identity surrounding the conflict pits “‘indigenous Tanzanians’ against 
‘outside investors’ (who are non-indigenous Tanzanian citizens [of Asian descent.])25 Animosity 
towards the Asian minority in Tanzania is entrenched in the political culture “as socialist-era 
nationalism… [denounced] Asian citizens who accumulated private capital as bloodsucking 
exploiters of citizenship.”26 Relying on this notion of authentic Tanzanian identity, peasants use 
it to legitimize their demands, which they express “through violence, protests, civil disobedience, 
and the multiparty system.”27 What is striking in the political use of a unified Tanzanian identity 
is that the peasants of the Kiru Valley are culturally and ethnically heterogeneous, many of them 
coming from families that migrated to the region to work on the estates of colonists.  
This broad, de-ethnicized political identity emerges as a product of the direct rule of land, 
which generates this identity in two ways. First, the state’s land allocation decisions are not 
based on historical ethnic claims. Since ethnicity has no force under Tanzania’s statist tenure 
system, that form of identity is supplanted by a nationalistic one with greater numerical strength, 
capable of giving coherence to peasants’ claims. In this way, direct rule of land creates an 
incentive structure which is more conducive to the formation of broader identity coalitions that 
are not necessarily limited by distinctions of ethnicity. Political action in land conflict that is 
grounded in a nationalist identity therefore becomes tenable and viable. 
                                                 
25 Boone and Nyeme, “Land Institutions and Political Ethnicity in Africa,” 75. 
26 Ronald Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Post-Colonial Africa, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 3. 
27 Boone and Nyeme, “Land Institutions and Political Ethnicity in Africa,” 75. 
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Second, direct rule requires that appeals be made to state bureaucrats and therefore in a 
political language that resonates with that audience. As peasants seek to target state land 
administrators, they appropriate the discourse and ideology of Tanzanian nationalism, in an 
attempt to talk to and sway bureaucrats using their own terms. James Scott’s work on peasant 
resistance brings to light the rhetorical appropriation of the discourse of the state by 
smallholders.28 Whereas Scott analyzes this phenomenon in southeast Asia, Brockington 
similarly points to “a tradition of rural peoples exploiting their rulers and their rulers’ rhetoric in 
Tanzania.”29 The discourse and ideology of national identity is entrenched in Tanzanian state 
tradition, making it a point of leverage that peasants exploit in the land conflict of the Kiru 
valley.30 The legacy of Nyerere’s socialist nationalism gives a degree of salience to claims that 
are couched in its language. Under direct rule, political communication and claims are articulated 
in such a way as to appeal to the modernist outlook of the state. 
With respect to contestation strategies, direct rule incentivizes peasants to raise land 
conflicts to regional and national political arenas. The smallholders of the Kiru Valley asserted 
their claims in the national court system, bringing the conflict out of the village level and 
implicating higher levels of state authority.31 In the run up to elections in 2010, a candidate of the 
Chadema party seized upon peasant grievances and campaigned on land issues. The peasants, in 
turn, “all… voted for Chadema.”32 Finally, the peasants’ various protests and forms of civil 
disobedience elicited a response from the government, which sent leading members of 
parliament to investigate the conflict. Together, the use of these national institutions as well as 
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the politically noisy mobilization of peasants in the valley indicate that land contestation scaled 
up in the system of direct rule of land in Tanzania. 
Testing the Hypothesis 
To be sure, Tanzania is a special case of nation-building. The legacy of a high modernist 
state and Nyerere’s socialism have left a considerable impact on the nation and the people.33 
Direct rule of land is itself a product of Tanzanian nation-building, as are all statist land tenure 
systems in that they are assertions of modern state power over traditional local power. Given the 
expansive history of nation-building, it is possible that factors other than the statist tenure regime 
contributed disproportionately to the nationalism and engagement with the state observed in 
Boone’s study. To further test the causality of direct rule of land, chapter two analyzes the 
political effects produced by the statist land tenure regime in two regions of Senegal in the 
1980s, where nation-building has proceeded less aggressively than in Tanzania, 34 making it a 
case with less potential for confounding variables. Chapter three tests the hypothesis with the 
case of Côte d’Ivoire, where the state for decades promoted the internal colonization of the cocoa 
and coffee forest regions, controlling the allocation of land and agricultural resources to this end. 
Finally, chapter 4 analyzes the peasant rebellion during the late 1970s and 1980s in the Tigray 
region of Ethiopia under the Derg’s communist regime, which undertook nationalization of land 
and agricultural collectivization. These cases were selected based on the occurrence of concerted 
rural movements, so as to study their scope and political identities, to deduce what produced 
those outcomes, and thereby strengthen or refute the hypothesis. After reviewing the findings, I 
                                                 
33 James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New 
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34 Donal Cruise O’Brien, “The Shadow Politics of Wolofisation,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 36, no. 1 
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conclude by linking them to present-day trends in African domestic and international politics and 
by outlining areas of future research.
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Chapter II: Peasant Politics and Land in Senegal, 1970s-1980s 
Introduction 
This chapter tests the hypothesis by examining the political identities and contestation 
strategies of peasants in Senegal, which has instituted a statist land regime. After a general 
overview of the context of land tenure in rural Senegal and the 1964 Loi sur le domaine national 
(1964 LDN), the law which aimed to establish the statist land regime, I analyze the effects it 
produced in two socially distinct regions, the groundnut basin of central Senegal and Lower 
Casamance, in the southwestern corner of the country. The findings from this section indicate the 
importance of social structure as a determining factor in the outcomes for peasant politics under 
statist land tenure systems. I first argue that the interaction of the statist land tenure system and 
the hierarchy of the groundnut basin actually produced a form of indirect rule, which in turn 
precluded the formation of peasant political identities and mobilization for land claims. I then 
show that the egalitarian social structure of Lower Casamance pushed the state to govern without 
relying on elite intermediaries, creating a more direct channel between Dakar’s land 
administrators and the peasantry in the region and giving the former greater capacity to act 
autonomously than in the groundnut basin. I argue that direct rule incentivized the adoption of a 
regional political identity and the emergence of a peasant-based secessionist movement. The 
conclusion summarizes the arguments and relates the findings to the hypothesis. 
The Legal and Economic Context of Land in Senegal 
 The French colonial state’s limited penetration into rural society as well as its reliance on 
rural notables as administrative middlemen were phenomena of the Senegalese colonial period 
that left many traditional social structures, including those relating to land governance, in place 
and in many cases stronger than before the arrival of Europeans. After independence, the 
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enduring influence of traditional authorities contrasted sharply with the modernist vision of 
Léopold Senghor’s government, whose members were influenced by the French political culture 
of republican national uniformity and centrally managed capitalism.1 The Senegalese state 
sought early on to assert its authority over rural leaders by enacting the 1964 Loi sur le domaine 
national (LDN), the most important formal law which governs land allocation and tenure.  
Through the 1964 LDN, “the state formally appropriated all powers and prerogatives to 
distribute land throughout the entire national territory.”2 For the terms of this study, Senegal 
therefore has a solidly statist land tenure regime.3 The law classifies 95% of land as belonging to 
the “national domain,” which is supposed to be administered in a decentralized manner by 
elected bodies, known as Rural Councils.4 The Rural Councils consist of local representatives as 
well as leaders of farming cooperatives and are supposed to govern the allocation of land and 
resolve disputes for groups of thirty to fifty villages.5 Through the Rural Councils, the 1964 LDN 
aimed to usurp the power of traditional leaders and to place it in the hands of municipalities, 
falling under the developmentalist and modernizing reach of the party-state, at the time 
controlled by the Parti socialiste. 
The 1964 LDN ordered the Rural Councils to grant tenure security to those who were 
working the land in a productive way at the time of adoption, provided that the tenant lived in the 
community where the land was located.6 Land is not considered to be inalienable property under 
the 1964 LDN; an individual simply receives the right to manage it from the Rural Councils and 
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this right can be revoked if the management is not deemed to be productive. In the terms of the 
law, the land is “affected” to individuals, families, or corporations and their continued right to 
use of the land is contingent on their productive exploitation of it. As land rights would be 
granted to those who worked the land, traditional forms of land tenure in which a landholder 
does not directly exploit the land, such as share cropping or seasonal leasing, would become 
illegal. The intent to eradicate these forms of land tenure gave the law its developmentalist 
thrust, as it sanctioned a modernized yet communitarian form of agriculture.7 In light of the 
requirement of community membership for rights to land, the law sought to support the 
wellbeing of local farmers and the economic development of whole communities, who would be 
shielded from speculative land grabs of outsiders. The extent to which the modernist vision of 
1964 LDN has been realized, however, varies significantly across regions with traditional leaders 
in the groundnut basin, for example, capturing the Rural Councils to perpetuate feudal forms of 
land tenure.  
Turning to the economic context, Senegal is an agrarian, low-income country. In 2017, 
60% of the population was engaged in the agricultural sector, producing 15% of GDP. 8  The 
principal export crop is the groundnut, which is grown by 27% of all households and by 52% of 
households in extreme poverty.9 To this day, the groundnut has continued its historical 
dominance of agriculture but donor and state projects to diversify the rural economy have 
targeted rice and fruit cultivation. Although the cases examined in this section date to the 70s and 
80s, when state-builders were still in the process of constructing the post-independence political 
and economic order, these current statistics underscore the importance of the land tenure system 
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to Senegal’s developing economy. Today as in the past, the land tenure system affects 
livelihoods and development objectives across the country. While land conflicts have escalated 
in the 21st century, access to land has been an extremely contentious issue for decades, as 
demonstrated by the case study of Lower Casamance in the late 1970s and 1980s.Throughout 
Senegal’s independent history, urbanization, proliferation of foreign land-grabbing, and state-led 
agro-industrial development initiatives have put increasing pressure on peasants.10 Recent years 
have seen an increase in the amount of land held by foreign corporations and there is an ongoing 
national debate over pro-peasant versus agro-industrial land tenure systems and the extent to 
which the government should favor either of these approaches.11 Having outlined the economic 
context and the legal contours of the land regime in Senegal, let us now look more closely at its 
ramifications for the political identities and contentious activities of small farmers. 
Peasant Politics and the Land Tenure Regime in the Groundnut Basin and Lower 
Casamance 
How has the formally statist, non-ethnic system of land allocation in Senegal shaped the 
political identities and contestation strategies of peasants? One can observe both statist and 
quasi-traditional forms of land tenure in Senegal, since regional variations in social structure 
dramatically affect the actual extension of the statist land tenure system. Given regional 
differences in the degree of contact between the state and rural people, regional outcomes for 
political identities and contestation strategies, the two aspects of peasant politics with which I am 
concerned, differ correspondingly. In the socially-hierarchical groundnut basin of central 
Senegal, where the marabout notables used the statist land tenure laws to reinforce their 
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authority, peasants are locked in feudal relationships that heavily discourage the formation of 
political identities and contestation strategies. In egalitarian Lower Casamance, on the other 
hand, contact between peasants and the state fostered scaled-up contention, in the form of a 
regional secessionist movement, which pressured the state for changes in land allocation. Similar 
effects on identity and contestation emerged in Lower Casamance and Tanzania, I argue, because 
of direct rule of land. This section will parse out the regionally differing outcomes produced by 
the land tenure regime in Senegal. 
Marabout Capture of Statist Land Institutions in the Groundnut Basin  
In the Wolof groundnut basin of central Senegal from 1964 to the early 1990s, day-to-day 
land allocations and conflicts were de facto governed by Muslim holy men and leaders known as 
marabouts, whose control of statist institutions allows them to perpetuate the feudal dependence 
of their peasant-followers. As noted, decision-making power over land was invested in the Rural 
Councils, which oversee land allocations for groupings of villages. Despite the universal scope 
and statist character of the 1964 LDN, the marabout elites of the groundnut basin captured the 
Rural Councils, using them to reinforce their dominance. Exploiting their political and electoral 
clout as the leaders of a hierarchical society and their ties to the Socialist Party, rural elites 
secured nominations to seats on the Rural Councils and thus solidified their land management 
powers.12 They effectively coopted the statist 1964 LDN and continued to govern land 
distribution and conflict, now with an aura of state authority. “As progressive and modernizing 
as the 1964 Loi sur le domaine national may have sounded at first, in [the groundnut basin] of 
Senegal its effects were deeply conservative,”13 with the decentralization of state land 
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institutions entrenching the authority of local elites. Moreover, “the goal of popular participation 
[in rural economic development] was not accomplished, since state resources became the object 
of patrimonial and clientelist management by the rural councils, headed by local notables.”14 In 
this way, the decentralization of state power into the hierarchical, feudal society of the groundnut 
basin actually stymied the development of a modern and democratic political system in the 
region. 
Regarding the effects on political identity and contestation over land conflicts, the statist 
Rural Councils produced outcomes that differ sharply from the broad-based and highly 
contentious ones observed in Tanzania. Given that the Rural Councils cemented the existing 
feudal relationship between peasants and marabout landlords in the groundnut basin, it is 
reasonable to ask whether peasants there are able to conceive of a political identity and 
contestation strategy in land conflict at all. Under the hierarchically enforced stasis of feudalism, 
the opportunities and incentives favoring the creation of a peasant political identity or 
contestation strategy are minimized by the relationship of dependence, through which access to 
land is mediated. The dependence of the peasant on the landlord means his claim to land is 
purely individual, not based on a civic or national identity.15 There is no public space for 
articulating claims on the basis of belonging to a collectivity; land claims are resolved in private 
between marabout and peasant. In the groundnut basin, this individual relationship is however 
characterized and structured by shared adherence to Islam. As such, peasants should be 
motivated to accentuate their pious commitment to the faith and their marabout leader, in order 
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to establish loyalty to him and receive additional land allocations or a favorable decision when a 
conflict arises with another peasant. Nevertheless, the relational and personal nature of claims to 
land in a feudal system precludes the formation of a political identity; there is no incentive to 
identify with a collectivity to assert a land claim since they are personal affairs between the 
marabout and peasant.  
Contestation is similarly limited in this relationship. As isolated dependents of a 
marabout, peasants lack the unifying power of a political identity that could give birth to a 
collective movement to secure better land allocations. Moreover, the social hierarchy is also 
justified and perpetuated by religious sanction; Marabouts “made groundnut cultivation a 
religious duty for the peasants of central Senegal.”16 Any attempt to criticize or revolt against the 
socioeconomic order surely jeopardizes the commitment of a peasant to the faith in the eyes of 
the marabout and the religious community. Since the relationship between peasant-disciples and 
the marabout is underwritten by piety, the former run the terrible risk of eviction from the land if 
they demonstrate unfaithful behavior by challenging the established order.  
Finally, we may deduce a basic understanding of the political weakness of the groundnut 
basin peasantry, and by implication the absence of unified political identities and contestation 
strategies, by examining the alliance that developed between the Socialist Party and the marabout 
elite, which solidified political order in the region. Since the state was able to rely on indirect 
rule in this region, what does that say about the political activity of the peasantry there? Under 
the feudal system, peasants were electoral bargaining chips of the marabouts. Beck emphasizes 
the marabouts’ control over the political action of the peasantry, noting that they “have been 
characterized as the grands électeurs who historically have utilized their religious authority and 
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the hierarchical structure of the brotherhoods to mobilize their disciples into large voting 
blocs.”17 Knowing that electoral success could be guaranteed by the support of the marabouts, 
with their utter control over the peasantry, “Senghor’s government used all means at its disposal 
to institutionalize the conservative coalition of notables upon which it rested.”18 The post-
independence government thus secured its reign by accepting the rural elite’s control over 
institutions such as the Rural Councils.19 Given the political subjugation and electoral 
manipulability of peasants in this feudal system, indirect rule was a politically expedient and 
necessary tactic for Senegalese central leaders. That the peasants of the groundnut basin were so 
easily controlled by their marabout leaders confirms their political disempowerment, and for the 
purposes of my argument, a corresponding weakness in political identity and autonomous 
contestation. 
Ultimately, Senegal’s statist land tenure regime, which “was explicitly designed to end 
exploitation of peasants by [marabout landowners] and others”20 was subsumed and transformed 
into an institutional buttress for the social hierarchy in the groundnut basin. Whereas the 1964 
LDN was formally a developmentalist and modernizing law, its application in practice 
entrenched the traditional authorities of the groundnut basin. Consequently, its effects on the 
political identity and contestation strategies of peasants, far from initiating an animation rurale 
and stirring peasant consciousness, were simply to perpetuate the relationship of dependence, 
opening no channels for collective action. Claims to land remained localized and individualized, 
an affair between the marabout and the disciple in this context of order and piety. Religious 
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sanctioning of the social order and the importance of pious subjugation to the marabout strongly 
disincentivized the creation of political identities and strategies for contesting land claims. Cruise 
O’Brien highlights the collective disempowerment of the peasantry of the groundnut basin, 
noting that “the mass of peasant producers indeed have few economic or political resources, with 
established rural leaders already partially committed to the state apparatus. They do nonetheless 
have the means of an effective passive resistance…. Such a choice [however] certainly offers no 
long-run solution to the dire material problems of the Senegalese peasantry.”21  
The history of the land tenure regime in the groundnut basin of Senegal points to the 
importance of social context and power differentials between the state and local authorities in 
determining the extent to which a statist regime comes into contact with rural peoples. In 
particular, rural social hierarchies can pose insurmountable obstacles to the modernizing visions 
of central states. Rural social structure is therefore an important variable in determining the 
political outcomes produced under statist land regimes. The next section clarifies our 
understanding of social structure as a variable by analyzing the political effects produced by 
Senegal’s land tenure regime in Lower Casamance, home to the egalitarian Diola society. This 
non-hierarchical society makes Lower Casamance an important test case for social structure as 
an intermediate determinant of the political effects produced by statist land tenure regimes. The 
outcomes it produced are more in line with those observed in Tanzania, as rural peoples 
mobilized collectively to challenge the state’s management of land. The form of political identity 
that tied this movement together differed slightly from that of Tanzanian peasants; the peasants 
of Lower Casamance adopted a regional identity, not a nationally encompassing one as in 
Tanzania, although both were unconcerned with ethnicity. 
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Statist Land Intervention and Regional Backlash in Lower Casamance 
Senegal’s Casamance region is located south of the Gambia. A result of the perverse 
national boundaries created during colonial rule, Casamance is geographically separated from the 
rest of Senegal by the territorial strip of the Gambia.  Moving from east to west, the region is 
divided into Upper, Middle, and Lower Casamance. Occupying the southwestern corner of 
Senegal, Lower Casamance is a lush, non-Sahelian region with fertile soils.22 In the colonial 
period, peasants cultivated rice and fruit in addition to groundnuts there, thanks to adequate 
rainfall. In the 1960s, these favorable agricultural conditions supported a population of 
prosperous peasants who “lived in better houses and ate better than farmers anywhere else in 
Senegal…. There were districts around Bignona, just south of the Casamance River, with some 
of the highest rural population densities in all of West Afirca.”23  
The region is home to the Diola people, whose societies are characterized by egalitarian 
cohesiveness and a culture of horizontal solidarity.24 Diola society has “no castes, no monarchies 
or aristocracies, and no hierarchical or bureaucratic state structures.”25 As in the groundnut basin, 
religious life in Lower Casamance is implicated in the organization of society, but with an effect 
opposite to that of maraboutic Islam. Pélissier notes that Diola religious tradition sustains social 
equality and cohesion by emphasizing “honor, respect for the wellbeing of others, the duty of 
solidarity, and pride in the family and the group.”26 In the areas where Islam has taken hold in 
Lower Casamance, it has done so “less uniformly and less hegemonically than in the North, and 
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not in the form of the centralized brotherhoods that so dominate central Senegal.”27 Moreover, 
mutual-aid organizations uphold the principals of social equality and cooperation in daily life, 
providing shared farm labor and additional assistance during difficult seasons for their 
members.28 Pélissier asserts that these groups “plainly manifest the Diola sense of solidarity.”29  
Before analyzing the process by which direct rule pushed Diola peasants, and those belonging to 
other ethnic groups of Lower Casamance, to collectively contest the state’s land management, I 
will clarify why and how the presence of an egalitarian society brought about a more aggressive 
application of statist land tenure there than in the hierarchical groundnut basin. 
The egalitarian society of Lower Casamance required a different strategy of rule than the 
one employed in the groundnut basin. The region’s horizontal social structure constrained the 
ways in which the central state could control and govern, since Diola society “lacked the social 
hierarchies that can provide ready-made infrastructure for indirect rule.”30 That is, the absence of 
distinct leaders, who could function as intermediaries to guarantee the electoral support of the 
peasantry as well as its submission to taxation, meant that the central state had to truly pursue 
direct rule in Lower Casamance.  
Instead of passively allowing dependable local elites to capture the Rural Councils as in 
the groundnut basin, Dakar made its agents oversee and intervene in local land decisions, acting 
as the authority over land starting in 1979, when a groundnut price crisis and prolonged drought 
necessitated a transformation of the agricultural sector. For example, although “land allocation 
was the main responsibility of the new elected [Rural Councils]…. sous-préfets [unelected 
administrators chosen by the state] usually handled land questions in more-or-less unilateral 
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fashion.”31 By way of the sous-préfets, the state asserted itself directly into local land affairs, 
creating a new dimension to its relationship with the peasantry as well as new points of contact 
to which collective action could be directed. What is more, this project of direct rule picked up 
considerable strength in the 1980s when national financial interests and aid agencies began 
pressuring the state to diversify the economy beyond the struggling groundnut sector.32 The state 
set out to develop and modernize agriculture in Lower Casamance, further enhancing the 
administrative strength and prerogatives of its agents and, crucially, facilitating access to land for 
outsiders. To this end, it turned a blind eye to violations of the 1964 LDN which prohibits the 
allocation of land to individuals who do not live in the community. Centrally led development 
projects and extensive land allocations to wealthy non-local investors ensued: 
Around Ziguinchor and Cap Skirring, the Rural Councils were instruments by which 
 Casamançais from other localities, functionaries native to other regions of Senegal, 
 marabouts from the groundnut basin and their peasant followers, Dakarois, and even 
 French firms acquired land for groundnut production, orchards, touristic encampments, 
 or fishing rights. These same actors lined up to get a piece of the action in new irrigation  
 and land reclamation projects, many of them financed in part by international lenders 
 such as the World Bank.33 
 
These highly disruptive interventions incited the fury of the Diola, who were dismayed to see 
their lands falling into the hands of outsiders to the detriment of the local population, with the 
full-fledged support of Dakar. Pointing to the economic and cultural importance of land, Darbon 
notes that “the state and notably its public development agencies continually undermined the 
Diola’s precious connection to the Earth.”34 The sense of “an invasion and systematic land 
expropriation by nordistes”35 galvanized the Diola who initiated broad-based collective action 
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against the state and the status quo of land allocation. A group known as the Mouvement des 
Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) organized the peasants’ collective action and 
asserted secessionist claims through protests as well as destruction of state property and violence 
against officials. Throughout these mobilizations, the peasants adopted a regional political 
identity, emphasizing the unity of Casamance against a conspiracy of exploitative interests 
supported by Dakar. The analysis of these political effects demonstrates that the direct rule of 
land conditioned peasants’ adoption of a regional political identity and their mobilization in 
Lower Casamance. Before treating the ways in which direct rule influenced the forms of 
contention, let us clarify the processes leading to mobilization. 
Explaining Mobilization in Lower Casamance 
 Lower Casamance’s political and economic marginalization within the “Islamo-Wolof”36 
state primed the region for contentious activity. The political status quo ruptured as the state 
intensified its pro-nothern land allocations and development projects in the late 70s and early 
80s, following the crash of groundnut prices and sustained droughts. This burst of heightened 
state intervention, encouraged by international creditors, marked the social change episode that 
triggered the MFDC’s mobilization. Seeing more and more outsiders gaining access to land and 
the benefits of development schemes, the Casamançais saw the central state as depriving them of 
resources and engaged in threat attribution, this instance being more direct and proximal than 
what was felt over the previous decades of generalized political-economic exclusion.37 
Simultaneously, a new opportunity emerged for a concerted challenge to Dakar’s increasingly 
unfair clientelism. In November of 1981, a group of Diola officials and notables met in secret at 
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the regional airport to form the MFDC.38 Having organized a core group of motivated actors, the 
movements’ initial members were able to expand their following by tapping into Diola mutual-
aid groups and the generally robust networks of cooperation and solidarity; this social 
appropriation allowed the movement to generate considerable strength, spreading into rural 
forest communities.39 From these mobilizing sites, the MFDC coordinated protests and guerrilla 
tactics, in what amounted to a full-fledged insurgency against the Senegalese state. 
Direct Rule of Land and Political Effects in Lower Casamance 
Direct rule operated in two ways to produce the political identity and mobilization with 
which we are concerned; it first created the regional frustration that motivated peasants’ 
collective action across Lower Casamance and then implicated the central state as the authority 
behind the population’s marginalization and, therefore, the state became the target to which 
collective action was to be directed. As direct rule of land linked the central state’s land 
decisions and actions to the shared regional experience of hardship, it provided the impetuses for 
the articulation of a regional political identity and the broad-based secessionist movement 
throughout Lower Casamance. By analyzing the political incentives created by the statist 
administration of land, I aim to illuminate the processes by which the state’s management of land 
in Lower Casamance fomented peasant identity formation and collective action at the regional 
level.  
Turning first to political identity, the one adopted by peasants connected to the 
secessionist movement was regional in nature and inclusive of ethnic diversity, even though the 
movement was dominated by the Diola people. Nevertheless, Beck writes that Casamance 
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separatists “do not… rely on a rhetoric of ethnic mobilization, but rather regional identity in 
response to malign neglect by state institutions which the separatists claim are dominated by 
northerners, and to what the separatists describe as the ‘invasion’ of the Casamance by 
‘northerners.’”40 Direct rule gave rise to this regional political identity by uniformly subjecting 
the peasantry of Lower Casamance to expropriation and economic marginalization, regardless of 
ethnicity. In this way, direct rule of land created a shared grievance, around which peasants 
unified themselves and on which they based their political identity. By transcending ethnicity 
and creating a region-wide experience of economic and political exclusion, direct rule groups the 
peasants of Lower Casamance together, linking them through the common grievance of reduced 
access to land.  
In light of the structural dominance of northern interests over state land decisions, direct 
rule further accentuated regional divisions, with the Casamançais seeing themselves under the 
yoke of Dakar and its Wolof partners.41 A Casamance regional political identity therefore 
became more salient as it was opposed to and contrasted against unjust domination by the 
northerners. In the context of Lower Casamance and its relation to the rest of Senegal, direct rule 
made regional identity a relevant category for peasants to use in articulating and unifying their 
claims. Just as direct rule of land appeared to foster a nationalist political identity in Tanzania, 
the salience of regional identity in Lower Casamance supports the hypothesis’ predictions that 
direct rule of land tends to generate political identities that extend beyond ethnicity and the scope 
of the village. 
This regional identity rhetorically unified the secessionist movement of Casamance. The 
secessionists engaged in all forms of protest, ranging from destruction of infrastructure to public 
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demonstrations.42 The first actions began in 1982, when “the MFDC organized a demonstration 
in which over a thousand Casamançais of various ethnic groups, though primarily Joola, 
marched through the streets of Ziguinchor, taking down the Senegalese flags from government 
buildings and replacing it with a white sheet as a statement of Casamance independence.”43  
Continuing the argument, the collective actions of the secessionist movement were 
generated by direct rule of land. To be sure, there is no shortage of analysts who “directly 
attribute the emergence of [the] guerrilla secessionist movement in Lower Casamance in 1982 to 
the application of Senegal’s administrative and land reforms in 1979.”44 In what way did direct 
rule of land lead peasant political action to take on the form of a social movement? The answer 
lies in the fact that direct rule shifted the scale at which peasant contestation became effective, 
making the regional secessionist movement a politically viable strategy, capable of producing 
desired outcomes. Direct rule of land made the state the target of land claims, which therefore 
incentivized peasants to build a movement that was capable of pressuring the state for change. In 
order to achieve the political goal of greater control over the allocation of land, the peasants of 
Lower Casamance constructed a movement that could realistically pressure the state, as the 
authority which currently controls that resource. Moreover, just as direct rule united the peasants 
of Lower Casamance in a shared experience of dispossession of land, it similarly facilitated the 
formation of the secessionist movement by creating ample potential supporters and recruits, 
eager to challenge the state’s land management. In other words, direct rule of land created both a 
logical basis for broad-based contestation and the political actors willing to contribute to that 
contestation. 
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Through the secessionist movement, the contestation of land management scaled up to a 
national level, raising questions about the territorial integrity of the Senegalese state and its 
authority over Lower Casamance. As a result of where direct rule located authority over land, the 
peasant movement responded with actions that rose to the level of the central state, going beyond 
village boundaries. The scaling up of the contestation produced an equivalent response from 
Dakar; Beck writes that  
President Diouf responded to the Casamance problem with [investments in]…. a number 
 of infrastructure projects: repairing roads as well as the bridge to Ziguinchor; building 
 schools; and initiating large development projects such as the Anambe-Kayan dam 
 funded by the Saudi government. The state also created a new commission on the 
 distribution of  land in Ziguinchor that was generally considered to be more equitable in 
 its decisions.45  
 
Simultaneously, Dakar deployed the military in order to eradicate secessionist guerillas and a 
simmering struggle between the state’s forces and the MFDC continues to this day. In this way, 
we see direct rule scaling up peasants’ contestation strategies to the national level in Lower 
Casamance, as in Tanzania, in line with the hypothesis, and even eliciting national-level 
responses. 
Conclusion 
The cases of the groundnut basin and Lower Casamance revealed firstly that social 
structure was critically determinative of the effects that Senegal’s formally statist land tenure 
regime produced for peasant politics. Political expediency and rural powerbases shaped the 
application of the law. In the groundnut basin, the marabouts’ domination of social and political 
life enabled that group to turn the law into a buttress to their existing authority, integrating it into 
the modern state. Indirect rule based on feudal social arrangements emerged in the region. I 
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argued that the rigidity and hierarchy of feudalism strongly disincentivized the formation of 
peasant political identities and contestation strategies. 
The absence of a social hierarchy in the societies of Lower Casamance forced the state to 
adopt a more rigorously statist approach to land management there. The egalitarian Diola people 
did not provide the social leaders who could be coopted as intermediaries of the state, as in the 
groundnut basin. Conflict over land erupted as the state began to allocate land to outsiders, 
displacing the local populations. The regional political identity and the secessionist movement 
which it supported were products of the direct rule of land in Lower Casamance. Firstly, the 
state’s land allocations affected peasants across the region, giving them a shared grievance 
around which they articulated a regional political identity. Secondly, the fact of the state’s 
control over land made it the relevant target of land claims. Peasants in the region had an 
incentive to mobilize on a scale that would exert meaningful and threatening pressure on the 
state. Ultimately, the frictional relations between the state’s land administration and the Diola 
society, coupled with conditions for mobilization, pushed the region’s peasants to form the 
multi-ethnic, secessionist movement in Lower Casamance.
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Chapter III:  The Forest Frontier and Rural Politics in Côte d’Ivoire, 1990-
1999 
Introduction 
Throughout Côte d’Ivoire’s colonial and independent history, agriculture has occupied a 
place of central importance in politics. From independence in 1960 to democratization in 1990, 
the regime of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny built its political-economic order around a 
system of export agriculture, bargaining with clients and allocating state resources as needed. 
This chapter will first survey the system of export-led agricultural development that dominated 
the Ivorian economy from independence to the death of President Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. 
To set up the argumentative section, I address the state’s patterned interventions in customary 
land tenure systems and the tensions that emerged in rural areas as a result of this covert form of 
direct rule. In comparison with the more intensely statist systems of rural economic management 
studied in the Tanzania and Lower Casamance sections, the Ivorian system is referred to as being 
“semi-statist,”1 in that the state exercised tremendous influence over the rural economy without 
ever abolishing local tenure systems; through consistent intercessions from administrators, the 
state profoundly shaped broad trends in land allocation and agriculture, while traditional leaders 
continued to oversee quotidian affairs in these domains. The discussion of what scholars have 
called the Houphouëtist system will establish the historical context for the mutations in rural 
politics that occurred in the 1990s when the economic status quo was contested following 
Houphouët-Boigny’s death and the dissolution of his political coalition. After analyzing the 
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emergence of contestation, I will show how the pattern of state intervention in agriculture and 
land management produced the mutations, which were the electoral nationalization of the land 
question and the concomitant emergence of the concept of ivoirité, a political identity that 
conditioned full Ivorian citizenship on autochthony and “authentic” belonging to the nation-state. 
Both of these outcomes, I argue, support the hypothesis’ predictions regarding the upscaling and 
broadening of peasant contention and identities, respectively. 
The Ivorian Miracle: Export Agriculture, Immigration, and Patronage 
 A doctor and plantation farmer, Félix Houphouët-Boigny was elected president of Côte 
d’Ivoire in 1960, the year of its formal independence from France. Having risen to prominence 
for his successful leadership of cocoa and coffee planters in the late colonial period, he governed 
a one-party state with a charismatic, populist persona and was known fondly throughout most of 
his 33 years of rule as the Président Paysan (Peasant President) and Le Vieux (The Old One). His 
country stood out amongst the newly independent African states for its exceptional export-led 
growth, embrace of world capitalism, and relatively wealthy smallholder population in the 60s 
and 70s. GDP growth averaged 8% per year between 1961 and 1975, 2 while producers were paid 
a stable and internationally competitive price for their crops that increased with inflation.3 The 
subject of much scholarly debate, the so-called Ivorian Miracle was based on the extensive 
cultivation of cocoa and coffee throughout the countryside and the international boom in prices 
for these goods, spurred by demand from increasingly wealthy consumers in Europe and North 
America. During the colonial period, vast expanses of frontier forest land enabled a “cash crop 
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revolution,” which made Côte d’Ivoire the wealthiest colony of French West Africa.4 Influxes of 
migrant smallholders, often from poorer regions of the French West African empire, to the 
sparsely populated forest regions powered the expansion of the cash crop frontier and became a 
fixture of the Ivorian political-economy.  
Spurred by colonial precedent, steady immigration became an essential feature of Ivorian 
rural development for a number of reasons. In addition to political-economic forces discussed 
below, the intrinsic characteristics of cocoa production factored into the trend. Cocoa is most 
profitable when it is cultivated in fresh soils, which in turn drives outward expansion and the 
emergence of “pioneer fronts,” cleared by migrant farmers. Clarence-Smith and Ruf explain the 
dynamics of cocoa pioneer fronts and are worth quoting at length: 
 In the 1980s… comparative research demonstrated the dependence of cocoa cultivators 
 on the exploitation of a ‘differential forest rent,’ in the Ricardian sense of the term. A 
 forest rent exists because it is rarely economically viable to replace decrepit cocoa trees 
 by new ones in the same land, or to plant cocoa in land used previously for other crops, 
 as long as forest is available. Planters clearing poorly regenerated secondary forest and 
 former coffee groves to grow cocoa in eastern Madagascar found that they could not 
 compete on the world market. Producers clearing primary forest, in contrast, benefited 
 from the fertility of virgin soils and low concentrations of weeds, pests and diseases…. 
 Given the existence of this forest rent, cocoa cultivation has been marked by the sporadic 
 emergence of new ‘pioneer fronts,’ defined as large groups of immigrants rapidly 
 clearing tropical forest to plant cocoa.5 
 
In light of cocoa’s logic of profitability, Houphouët-Boigny’s government facilitated a steady 
flow of migrants to frontier regions, coercing local authorities to welcome them and to give them 
access to land.6 With the post-war commodity price boom in full swing, the independent 
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government reaped considerable benefits from this model of agricultural development based on 
pioneering small farmer immigration 
Initiated under encouraging geographic, ecological, and market conditions, export-led 
development was sustained by patronage politics: “the dominance of Houphouët-Boigny’s Parti 
Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) rested on an elaborate system of patronage financed by 
agricultural export earnings.”7  The government was able to derive the bulk of its revenue 
through its marketing board, which retained a portion of the price it received for the crops on the 
international market. When not being stored in the price stabilization fund or devoted to 
development projects, export taxes were used to satisfy political clients and to shore up the 
PDCI’s hold on power.8 The rents and benefits of export agriculture “constituted a powerful 
instrument for paternalist regulation of the sociopolitical space, assuring a certain stability within 
the political system.”9  
The survival of Houphouët-Boigny’s regime was thus dependent on the good functioning 
and expansion of export agriculture. Constant immigration, to drive the sector, was all the more 
necessary. Seeking to maximize export earnings and driven by the constraints of cocoa 
profitability, Houphouët-Boigny used an open-door immigration policy to bring farmers from 
Burkina Faso, Mali, and other poorer countries to the southern and western forest lands.10 
Farmers from the northern regions were encouraged to become cocoa pioneers as well. As their 
numbers increased, the migrant laborers at the forefront of Ivorian agriculture became a 
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significant and valuable constituency, in many southwestern districts comprising at least 20% 
and up to 25% of the population.11  
 The obedience of the growing number of smallholders became a necessity for the PDCI, 
hoping to maintain a stable and unobstructed flow of exports to the world market. By appealing 
to the rural producers from which it derived its wealth and power, giving special attention to the 
migrant population, the PDCI secured an economic and political order in the countryside. 
Chauveau describes the social contract that emerged, writing, “In return for guarantees in respect 
of prices, outlets, farm inputs and a rising standard of living, rural people were expected to show 
political submission and recognize the monopoly of the state and its agents over management of 
the cash crop sector.”12 The coalition between rural peoples and the PDCI underpinned what 
Chauveau terms a “peasant state,” in which the party-state ensured its survival by negotiated 
access to the wealth produced by small farmers. 
The negotiations and interventions that facilitated this relationship are indicative of the 
state’s influence over the rural economy and peasant livelihoods and, therefore, of great 
importance to the argument here. A system of inconspicuous direct rule emerged with the 
strategies that the state used to maintain its export-dependent political-economic order. While it 
continued to recognize the authority of customary leaders over day-to-day land decisions, the 
PDCI directed its agents to facilitate the expansion of the cash crop frontier. To this end, a semi-
statist system took shape as:  
 non-Ivorian and Ivorian colonists [of the frontier] enjoyed protection in gaining access 
 to land: pressures were applied to the local village authorities and communities to get 
 them to welcome migrant farmers…. Disputes were settled in favor of migrants who were 
 developing the land; locals were forbidden to make foreigners pay rent; and the 
 infiltration of protected forests was tolerated. In the North, if crops were damaged by 
 large herds practicing transhumance, government agents sided with the herd owners. In 
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 the Western forest region, landed estates were allocated to members of the ruling elite, 
 who often originated from the East or Centre of the country.13  
 
The state, therefore, worked on the behalf of its pioneer smallholder clients and others who were 
seen as contributing to export agriculture throughout the 60s and 70s. This pattern of state 
intercession in rural society constitutes the peasant-state relationship that, as hypothesized, 
should cause smallholder contestation strategies and political identities to respectively scale 
upwards and to become more inclusive. The Ivorian case is, however, unique in that customary 
authorities continued to oversee day-to-day aspects of rural social and economic life.14 The 
enduring authority of traditional leaders, whose governance tended to favor members of the 
ethnic group and blood-based claims to land, sustained the salience of ethnicity in rural society. 
As we will see, the interaction of an ethnically-conscious rural population with state support for 
outsiders produced an electoral mobilization for xenophobic, nationalist politicians appealing to 
disaffected rural autochthones. This mobilization occurred following a decade of mounting 
tensions in rural areas, produced by intractable problems within the political-economic order, and 
the political vacuum that appeared in the wake of Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993, events to 
which we now turn. 
The End of Houphouëtism and the Reconfiguration of the Ivorian Polity 
A confluence of events undermined the stability of Houphouët-Boigny’s regime and its 
rural and urban coalitions throughout the 1980s.15 First, undeveloped forest land became scarce, 
while the populations seeking to farm it continued to rise. Tensions between indigenous and 
migrant farmers rose as land became less accessible. While minor disputes between the two 
groups were commonplace in the preceding decades, they became more virulent and numerous 
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as supplies of unworked land dwindled.16 Where the state had previously been able to negotiate 
and coerce the settlement of land disputes, it now faced disgruntled farmers without the 
convenience of a forest frontier. Moreover, commodity prices slumped in the 1980s, causing 
state revenues, read as patronage resources, to dry up. As a result, the PDCI’s ability to appease 
elites and gain their loyalty weakened somewhat. Worse yet, these difficulties were compounded 
by the fact that the government found itself  unable to pay off its loan debt. Bitten by the 
dependence for which it had opted, Côte d’Ivoire was ironically constrained by the system that 
had made it the success story of African independence and export-led development within the 
world economy. 
Seeking reprieve from its financial distress, Houphouët-Boigny’s regime turned to the 
international lending agencies and became one of the first African governments to implement a 
structural adjustment package in exchange for debt relief. Liberalization and retrenchment, while 
intended to raise producer prices and protect against urban-bias, exacerbated other conditions for 
small farmers, who had benefitted from the marketing board, price stabilization, and technical 
assistance, all of which were now reduced or eliminated. Rural areas experienced further duress 
as urban-dwellers, formally employed in administration and parastatals, lost their jobs and 
returned to their villages of origin in search of land and farm work. “Finding that their elders had 
distributed most of their land to strangers, leaving little for their sons to cultivate or live on, 
urban returnees vented their frustration – berating their elders for depriving them of their 
patrimony, while joining them in resentment against the immigrants whom they regarded as 
exploiters.”17  
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As rural and urban areas wrestled with unemployment and a faltering economy, Ivorians 
began calling for democratization and the end of one-party rule. Combined with demands to the 
same end from international donors, Houphouët-Boigny ushered in multi-party competition and 
announced a presidential election in 1990.18 He won the election and remained in office, though 
unprecedented fissures in the Ivorian polity had emerged and would go unaddressed in the final 
years of Houphouëtism. In the forest regions, schisms between indigenous and immigrant 
populations came to the fore as land disputes intensified and began to turn on communal 
belonging and inherited, traditional rights. More than ever, the categories of insider and outsider 
became apparent. What is more, state policies of favoring migrants increasingly came under 
scrutiny and drew the ire of indigenous groups, as the basis for their dispossession.  
Perceptions of differential treatment and state favoritism further activated insider and 
outsider identities. Hitherto unchallenged, the ethnic hierarchy of the state became a point of 
salience as well.19 Dominated by the Baoulé, Houphouët-Boigny’s ethnic group, the 
government’s cooperation with immigrants at the expense of the forest populations heightened 
unease and tension. Members of the fragmented and acephalous societies of the forest regions, 
frustrated by their land deprivation, came to see the government as a cabal of Baoulé and non-
indigenous interests. Lines of opposition were being drawn, with the “true” Ivorians, whose 
ancestors had inhabited the forest for generations, on one side and the corrupt government and its 
foreign clients on the other. These were the first signs of the mutations in rural political identities 
that would culminate in the adoption of ivoirité (Ivorianness) and the fierce debates over its 
meaning and scope. 
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Explaining Opposition Mobilization and Electoral Changes 
As tensions spread, questions of the state’s role in agriculture and of who should have 
access to land, employment, and citizenship attained new importance in Ivorian politics. Before 
these questions could come up for debate, the old Houphouëtist consensus had to be challenged. 
Why did the previously stable political scene become contested and what mobilized voters in 
opposition to the PDCI? Channeled for the most part through the new opposition parties, the 
Ivorian polity between 1993 and 1999 was recalibrated by processes of contained or institutional 
and transgressive contention,20 though forms of the latter became more commonplace as 
struggles wore on in the decade. The Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) and the Rassemblement des 
Républicains (RDR) seized on the political opportunities produced by sweeping social change 
processes, begun with the socio-economic crises and democratization and then amplified with 
the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993.21 Having bolstered the PDCI’s power with his 
charismatic leadership, Houphouët-Boigny’s death created additional space for contention. Henri 
Konan Bédié, a member of the PDCI and leader of the National Assembly, assumed the 
presidency in accordance with constitutional law, but the country’s first leadership change 
nonetheless stimulated contentious activity, with then prime minister Alassane Dramane 
Ouattara attempting a power grab. At the constituent level, as voters suffered unemployment and 
or came to resent outsiders, they increasingly attributed a threat to the PDCI’s status quo and 
became motivated to affiliate with opposition parties catering to their concerns. Thus, the PDCI 
faced institutional contention with the opposition’s mobilization of new supporters. Later on in 
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the decade, localized, yet widespread forms of transgressive contention emerged, such as 
expulsion of foreigners, which, while not directly aimed at the PDCI, still eroded its authority. In 
the southwestern region of Tabou, indigenous citizens took it upon themselves to expel 
Burkinabe workers; a journalist for Le Monde wrote, “what happened in Tabou is only an 
indication of what is happening throughout the country.”22 The spreading rural unrest was also 
rooted in the social change of economic crisis and the attribution of a foreign threat, but it 
interacted with the institutionalized, electoral contention and inflammatory anti-immigrant 
rhetoric of leading politicians. Moreover, as the opposition parties grew in stature, uncertainty 
and perceptions of the PDCI’s weakness mounted, stimulating transgressive contention in 
defiance of the law. 
The fracturing of the PDCI’s coalition and the rise of the opposition also point to the 
effect of social structure on the mobilization of opposition support. Specifically, social structure 
shaped the state’s regional presence and played into the opposition’s rise. Under one-party rule, 
regions were incorporated into the PDCI’s order to different degrees, according to the presence 
and leverage of regional brokers, as was the case in Senegal under the Parti socialiste. In the 
southwestern forest regions, society was organized into “small, decentralized settlements of 
farming households, where decisions were made by household heads or groups of elders, rather 
than by chiefs.”23 The absence of a substantial social hierarchy in these regions, populated by the 
Kru and southern Mandé ethnicities, meant that there were few regional intermediaries to 
negotiate the unfolding of Houphouëtism on the forest frontier. These populations were 
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consequently excluded from processes of internal party-state bargaining.24 The state therefore 
acted with fewer constraints in the region, allowing it to more aggressively promote land 
allocation for migrants, which ultimately contributed to the marginalization of the indigenous 
populations. As predicted by the hypothesis, the fragmentation of the southwestern forest 
societies permitted the state to intervene heavily in land allocation and to do so with fewer 
restrictions than in regions controlled by powerful intermediaries. The social character of the 
region led to both a more complete extension of state influence and the population’s exclusion 
from the patronage system. With the advent of democratization, the disgruntled, non-hierarchical 
populations of the forest frontier provided the electoral support for opposition parties, especially 
the FPI, to challenge the PDCI’s order. In this way, the variable of social structure produced an 
alienated constituency, frustrated with its structural domination, for the opposition to mobilize 
and with which to contest the status quo of the rural economy. 
With the opposition capitalizing on the social change processes and political 
opportunities that emerged in the wake of Bédié’s assumption of power, “one witnesses 
Houphouëtism on trial with a call for a reinvention of fundamental political comprises.”25 That 
reinvention proceeded with the electoral competition amongst the PDCI, the FPI, and the RDR, 
whose constituencies I describe below. In the campaigning, debates, and policies that came with 
this electoral jockeying, questions of the state’s role in agriculture and of who should have access 
to resources and rights were of central importance. That is, rural grievances and claims were 
newly contested in national electoral politics. Having tracked the conditions leading to electoral 
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contention, let us now examine the instances of scaled-up rural claims and political identities in 
that arena and analyze their roots in the legacy of Houphouëtist intervention in rural affairs. 
Ivoirité, the Land Law of 1998, and the State: The Upscaling of Rural Issues  
With the disintegration of Houphouëtism, the three parties each sought to construct 
electoral coalitions with direct appeals to rural constituencies. The FPI of Laurent Gbagbo 
primarily represented the disaffected indigenous populations of the West and Southwest forest 
frontier, which, for the reasons discussed earlier, saw themselves as excluded from the benefits 
of the PDCI’s political-economic order. 26 The RDR of Alassane Dramane Ouattara, the 
country’s current president, consisted of alienated PDCI cadres and a voting bloc in the majority 
Muslim North of herders and some farmers that had migrated to the frontier. Over the decade’s 
presidential and legislative contests, the opposition parties forced the PDCI, now led by Henri 
Konan-Bédié who assumed the presidency with the passing of Houphouët-Boigny, to reevaluate 
its own rural policies and rework its electoral base. The PDCI continued to control the Baoulé 
grouping in the center of the country, though it needed to shore up its appeal to other 
constituencies that were increasingly approached by the opposition. Influenced by the demands 
of electoral competition, the contestation of rural economic and land grievances became a central 
focus of national party politics, culminating in the passage of a new land code. Also of 
importance to the hypothesis, parties mobilized voters using the political identity of ivoirité, 
which combined both nationalist and ethnic rhetoric. I will describe these outcomes and then 
demonstrate the way in which the legacy of state intervention in rural affairs caused them to play 
out in national party politics and legislation.  
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As indigenous populations linked regional marginalization to the Houphouëtist state’s 
support for migrants, a nationalist xenophobia took hold across the countryside. To coopt these 
sentiments and to discredit his main challenger in the 1995 presidential election who had 
professional and diplomatic links to Burkina-Faso, Bédié deployed a new political identity, that 
of ivoirité.27 While multiple definitions exist, ivoirité generally fused both national and ethnic 
attachments, defining a true Ivorian citizen as someone who belonged to one of the country’s 
native ethnicities. A university theorist associated with Bédié wrote of the concept, “the 
individual who has ivoirité is a citizen of Côte d’Ivoire and is born of Ivorian parents belonging 
to one of the autochthonous ethnicities of Côte d’Ivoire.”28 It politicized and nationalized 
autochthony, conditioning citizenship and access to resources on being a “son of the soil.” 
Reflecting the coalition building requirements of multi-party elections, ivoirité combined 
nationalism and ethnicity in one political identity. 
 Bédié demonstrated his commitment to this new ideology with two legislative acts in 
particular. First, he reversed the PDCI’s historical openness to migrants by barring them from 
voting and running in future elections with the passing of a new electoral code in 1994.29 Over 
the next four years he also worked with opposition parties to craft a new land law. The Land Act 
of 1998 passed in the National Assembly and stipulated that only Ivorian nationals could own 
land. Land claims and identity were now inseparable and the state henceforth would recognize 
ownership strictly on the basis of citizenship, in a dramatic reversal of the legacy of pro-
immigrant intervention.30 Where previously the state had relied on a certain degree of legal 
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ambiguity to ensure that immigrants were given access to land and the right to work it, the new 
land law expressly barred them from ownership and mandated that they receive permission from 
customary proprietors to obtain use rights.31 The new emphasis on customary permission for 
non-citizen use rights empowered and appeased dispossessed autochthones, allowing them to 
evict unwanted foreign users.  
Like ivoirité, the land law was the product of the struggle to win rural constituents in a 
multi-party system: “party bosses and politicians were generally tempted to embrace the 
autochthonous claims of their electoral bases,”32 finally culminating in the new land tenure law. 
In the years leading up to its passage, the debates and appeals regarding the state’s land tenure 
system reflected the extent to which “the question of the distribution of increasingly scarce 
resources (landed property, jobs, various forms of power and their attributes, etc.) became the 
major issue in domestic politics.”33 It is in the electoral and legislative struggle over the land 
question that rural claims were contested at the highest level of politics, transcending their local 
origins. 
Analysts have pointed to the distinct combination of rural frustration and political 
identities that ivoirité and the Land Act of 1998 sought to valorize and coopt. Babo and Droz 
reveal the overlapping relation between the two policies, writing, “[ivoirité] was a question of 
redistributing to so-called true Ivorians political (state power), social (employment), and 
economic (land, water bodies, forests) resources.”34 As policies and mobilizing tools, ivoirité and 
the Land Act of 1998 at once honed in on political identity and rural dispossession, absorbing the 
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energy of ethnically-based land claims and hostility to the outsiders who stood in the way of 
them. 
Explaining the Effect of Semi-Statist Land Management  
Considered as outcomes, the contestation of land claims amongst national parties and the 
adoption of ivoirité conform to the predictions of the hypothesis. I argue here that they originated 
in the semi-statist management of the rural economy, referring to the legacy of “state facilitation 
of massive immigration of agricultural colonists in the forest region since independence”35 and 
the simultaneous acceptance of traditional, ethnicized authority over day-to-day land questions.  
Since the rural socio-economic crisis was rooted in the Houphouëtist system, its 
resolution could only be achieved by challenging and reconfiguring the state itself. Once it 
became clear that the PDCI’s control of the state and its management of land was the source of 
rural grievances, contestation had to be directed at the highest level of government in order to 
resolve them. As we have seen, the parties sought to prove their governing effectiveness and win 
supporters by elaborating new allocations of resources, which culminated for the countryside  
with the Land Act of 1998. Unlike the previous cases, multiparty democracy responded to and 
channeled rural unrest; voters mobilized in support of parties rather than with a transgressive 
collective movement. Rural claims were, nonetheless, contested on a national, elevated level, 
where state power could be won or at least effectively influenced to change. If Houphouëtist 
management of the rural economy required that successful contestation be directed at upper 
levels of government, multiparty democracy was the means by which that contestation 
proceeded, providing vote-seeking parties with an incentive to respond to rural grievances. 
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With respect to ivoirité, we must consider and show how the coexistence of traditional 
and statist institutions in the countryside produced this virulent blending of nationalist and ethnic 
political identity. Starting with its national component, Houphouëtism gave indigenous peasants 
a common experience of unequal treatment vis-à-vis the migrant population that the state 
welcomed and on whose behalf it intervened to allocate land. Mistrust of the PDCI’s old order 
was a unifying characteristic for many indigenous Ivorians, making a political identity which 
resonated with that group a valuable mobilizing tool for parties seeking to win voters. In this 
sense, the actions of the state in rural society created a class of dispossessed farmers, that were 
susceptible to xenophobic nationalism. Ultimately, it was the PDCI that reversed its stance on 
immigration and first espoused ivoirité to win this constituency.  
While obviously limited in its scope, Ivorité united ethnic identities based on an authentic 
belonging to the national community. As parties challenged the state’s perceived favoritism of 
non-nationals, they legitimized their claims with the element of civic national belonging 
contained in ivoirité. Groups espousing it justified their struggle by appearing as the patriotic and 
rightful inheritors of state power and resources, against a Houphouëtism that “privileges the 
individual to the detriment of the citizen.”36 Since the allocation of state resources and power 
both provoked the crisis and was being contested, ivoirité’s emphasis on citizenship and 
attachment to the nation made it a compelling political identity in the struggles over who should 
control the state and who should benefit from it. It effectively argued that the most “authentic” 
members of the polity should be the first to benefit from the state’s support. 
The ethnic component of ivoirité stemmed from the continued relevance of traditional 
authority in the semi-statist system. In a society where traditional authorities were still 
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recognized and where claims to land based on communal belonging were still considered 
legitimate, ethnicity remained a salient force and a meaningful basis for claims-making. Semi-
direct rule, which mixed secular-modern and ethnicized authorities, allowed ethnicity to retain its 
meaning and made it a politically relevant category, leading to its expression in ivoirité. Unlike 
the Tanzanian case, for example, where a highly statist system mostly eradicated vestiges of 
traditional authority and ethnic attachment, their continued existence in Ivorian society gave 
them a solidity on which to make political claims. The Houphouëtist system, in its simultaneous 
recognition of traditional and state authority over land, likewise generated the ethnic and 
nationalist force of ivoirité. 
Conclusion: The Legacy of Houphouëtism 
For two decades after independence, the Ivorian polity was held together by the PDCI’s 
patronal management of export-led development. The limits of the Houphouëtist system became 
apparent in the 1980s and political-economic order began to erode with the closing of the forest 
frontier and the end of the international commodity boom. Structural adjustment exacerbated the 
system’s complications. In the ensuing crises of employment and land scarcity, social change 
processes were unleashed and political opportunities opened up that spurred opposition 
movements. Following democratization, the structural alienation of the fragmented southwestern 
populations empowered the parties challenging the PDCI; again, the direct, unconstrained 
influence of the state over the egalitarian societies of the forest frontier indicates the importance 
of the social variable to the emergence of scaled-up contention. In this new context of multi-
party competition, parties courted indigenous rural constituencies and aimed to address the rural 
crisis by rewriting the land code and by redefining who would benefit from state support and 
resources with ivoirité. As forms of scaled-up contestation and broad-based political identity, 
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these outcomes are in line with the hypothesis. On the one hand, the state’s systematic 
interventions in the rural economy were the target of change and the source of grievances. To be 
successful and to strike at the root of the issue, contestation had to scale up to national party 
politics and force changes in the highest levels of authority. The Land Act of 1998 was the result 
of that contestation, which proceeded through mediatized and legislative debates from 1993 
onward. As “the Ivorian iteration of modern nationalism,”37 Ivoirité emerged as a direct 
challenge to the state’s openness to migrants, especially on the forest frontier. While a desire to 
reclaim the state motivated the nationalist aspect of this political identity, it also drew strength 
from the customary authorities and ethnic attachments that were allowed to thrive with the semi-
statist management of the rural economy. 
The high-level contestation of land allocation and the introduction of ivoirité originated 
in Houphouëtism. While on the surface appearing as measures for the reconstruction of a nation-
state, the Land Act of 1998 and ivoirité were manipulated to divisive, xenophobic ends and 
fueled indigenous attacks on foreigners. 38 Both of these phenomena ultimately contributed to the 
intensification of unrest in Côte d’Ivoire and its descent into civil war at the beginning of the 21st 
century. Having secured Côte d’Ivoire’s status as a developmental wonder in the 60s and 70s, 
Houphouëtism and its ripple effects set the country against itself, which should be remembered 
in debates of the Ivorian miracle and its long-term implications. Moreover, as the Ivorian case 
demonstrates, it is important to note that instances in which peasant concerns impact national 
politics will not necessarily result in a healthier, safer, or fairer society.
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Chapter IV: Rural Insurrection in Tigray, Ethiopia, 1975-1991 
Introduction 
This chapter tests the hypothesis against a case of armed peasant rebellion during the 
1970s and 1980s in Tigray province, located in northern Ethiopia. Organized by the Tigray 
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the province’s rural population rebelled against the system of 
direct rule under the communist military government, known as the Derg, which governed 
Ethiopia starting in 1974. Having toppled the imperial regime of Haile Selassie, the Derg 
initiated a radical program of land nationalization and statist control of the rural economy. These 
programs, I will argue, caused the scaling up of the two aspects of peasant politics, contestation 
strategies and political identities, analyzed in the preceding sections. Contestation strategies rose 
to the national scale, in that they targeted the highest levels of state authority and brought 
together rural Tigrayans in a regional insurgency. As for peasant political identities, the TPLF 
employed a form of narrow ethno-nationalism, an outcome which, in its reliance on ethnicity, 
diverges some from the hypothesis’ predictions. In the latter stages of its movement, the TPLF 
embraced cooperation with other ethnic groups, which conforms more to the inclusive political 
identities predicted by the hypothesis. I analyze these outcomes and test them against the 
hypothesis in the argumentative section. The conclusion summarizes the chapter and refines the 
role of social hierarchy as a variable within the hypothesis by comparing the differing outcomes 
for peasant politics in Tigray and the groundnut basin, two hierarchical societies. Before 
engaging the hypothesis, let us turn to the agricultural, social, and political context of the case. 
Tigray under Imperial Rule 
This section will first provide an overview of Tigrayan agriculture and society, which 
were based on a form of feudalism that linked the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the ruling 
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nobility, and the peasantry. The second half of the section describes the center-periphery relation 
between the imperial central government and the province during the 20th century and in the lead 
up to the 1974 military coup that deposed Emperor Haile Selassie. This perspective on pre-
revolutionary Tigrayan society and politics will help to contextualize the disruptions and 
subsequent grievances produced by the Derg’s interventions. 
 Tigray is located on the northern plateau of present-day Ethiopia, at altitudes ranging 
from 1500 to 10000 feet above sea level.1 Flat-topped mesas and deep gorges cover the region, 
giving it a topographical uniqueness. With erratic rainfall, severe droughts and consequent 
famines have plagued the region, notably from 1888-1892, 1973-1974, and 1984-1985.2 Despite 
semi-arid growing conditions, fixed agriculture is used to principally grow cereals, such as 
barley, wheat, and sorghum.3 Fertile soils support these crops but are highly susceptible to 
erosion as a result of vegetation clearance.4 Historically, Tigray was wealthy relative to the rest 
of the Ethiopian empire, with a solid productive output. Writing about 16th century Tigray, a 
Portuguese missionary commented, “‘it seems to me that in the whole world there is not so 
populous a country or one so abundant in crops’” and that inhabitants “‘gathered so much crops 
of all kinds that were it not for the worm, there would have been abundance for ten years.’”5  
This agricultural resplendence stemmed from Tigray’s advantageous position within the 
political order of the Ethiopian Empire, which was based on an alliance between the Amhara and 
the Tigrayan peoples. Together, these two groups of the larger region known as Abyssinia 
controlled a centralized Christian empire, whose rulers claimed a line of descent from King 
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Solomon and the Queen of Sheba.6 Tribute and loyalty flowed from provincial governors to the 
emperor, who conquered neighboring lands and dispensed justice with divine authority. 
Underpinning political order in Tigray was a system of indirect rule, in which “emperors had to 
depend on local leaders and… the ancient practice of building political loyalty through dynastic 
marriages in the province.”7 In the late 19th and 20th centuries, shifts in the locus of political 
power and disruptions produced by Italian incursions exacerbated relations between Tigray and 
Shoa, the imperial and Amhara-dominated capital. Such changes led to the economic 
marginalization and impoverishment of the region, although it retained a cohesive social 
organization and strong cultural identity. 
Traditional Tigrayan society was highly stratified, being organized around “the classic 
trinity of noble, priest, and peasant.”8 Up to the revolution in 1974, rural society was feudal, 
hierarchical, and largely unchanged over the past 500 years. 9 Peasants practiced fixed 
subsistence agriculture, yet sustained the Church and rulers, both of which heavily taxed their 
surplus production and demanded uncompensated labor. 10 The peasantry was “traditionally 
taxed to the limits of its capacity” to support the rest of the social pyramid.11 In return for their 
labor and tribute, peasants could depend on the local gentry for assistance in times of crisis and 
on the Church for salvation. Markakis notes that the counterbalance to steep inequality was a 
degree of “vertical integration which tends to diminish class antagonism to vanishing point.”12 
The vertical integration described by Markakis was reinforced by kinship ties between peasants, 
nobles and priests as well as Church teachings that linked the social order with divine will. A 
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Church pamphlet from the 1960s warned peasants against ambitions of drastic social 
advancement, asserting that “any human creature should keep his position in the hierarchy and 
know his capacity, and if he lives according to the position assigned to him by fate, he will have 
no regrets about himself or God.”13 It was, however, possible for a peasant to join the ranks of 
the priesthood or become a local ruler. Moreover, there was little difference in material wealth 
and cultural life between the lowest members of the ruling class and priesthood on the one hand, 
and the peasantry on the other. Close contact between the humblest priests and rulers minimized 
the sense of distance between the peasants and the non-productive classes as a whole, which 
enhanced social cohesion. Reinforced by familial bonds and the secular and religious upper 
classes’ promises of worldly and spiritual security, there was a fatalistic continuity to traditional 
life, although there was no shortage of small-scale rebellions and sayings that pointed to the 
harshness of life for the average rural Tigrayan. 
In this agricultural society, land was the most important economic asset and the systems 
used to govern it implicated all sections of the population. For the peasantry, access to land was 
determined by membership in the extended family or kinship group of an ancestor that was said 
to have first cleared land or to have received it from a royal grant. In order to receive a plot of the 
ancestral estate, it was necessary to prove one’s lineage through documentation. Such claims 
were respected and authenticated by the local secular and religious authorities. Elders of the 
kinship groups were responsible for allocating the land of the hereditary estates to land rights-
entitled family members, which essentially accounted for all Tigrayan peasants. This system in 
which land rights were allocated according to descent was called rist. Markakis summarizes the 
condition of the peasantry within this traditional tenure system, noting: 
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 The Christian peasantry of the northern provinces has always been a smallholder group 
 with secure rights to land. The rist system of landholding ensures that practically 
 everyone holds land…. Although it promotes fragmentation of holdings, this system has 
 prevented land alienation and the emergence of a landless class.14 
 
The rist system thus provided a stable foundation for the continuation of peasant economic 
activity, within a highly exploitative social structure and in the face of occasional droughts. State 
and Church recognition ensured the legitimacy and normal functioning of the system. 
 In light of the stability of peasant agriculture and its integration into a hierarchical, yet 
cohesive social order, pre-revolutionary rural Tigray does not appear as a region that would 
foster a massive uprising of small farmers. Forms of social control and relationships of 
dependence that would inhibit the formation of a broad-based peasant movement were deeply 
entrenched, as in the groundnut basin of Senegal. Frustration over land rights would, moreover, 
be directed to the elders of the kinship group as the authority over land, confining conflict to the 
local parish and the hereditary estate. The juxtaposition of this historic background of peasant 
acquiescence with the rural insurgency that appeared in the wake of the 1974 revolution draws 
out important implications for the argument, specifically regarding what changed such that the 
peasants became motivated to engage in a broad-based uprising. As I will argue below, the 
creation of direct rule institutions to govern the rural economy altered peasant-state relations 
such that insurgency became a viable and necessary contestation strategy. 
The Politics of Centralization in Tigray: End of the 19th Century to the Eve of Revolution  
 Even before the communist Derg had levelled the rural hierarchy to make way for direct 
rule, that form of government was taking shape in rural Ethiopia after Emperor Haile Selassie 
had initiated a campaign of centralization, aiming to undermine the regional nobility and increase 
the state’s presence in the lives of its subjects. In Tigray, this trend in centralization was tainted 
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by a regional sense of betrayal and marginalization. As nobles and peasants felt the pains of 
Amhara domination, the centralization program only exacerbated an already fraught relation 
between the region and the imperial government. 
 Tigrayan frustration with the Amharan government was the product of a confluence of 
negative experiences across the region, beginning in the 1880s with the Italian invasion of the 
province of Eritrea, just north of Tigray. There was a large Tigrigna speaking population in 
Eritrea, who shared an affinity with their co-linguists to the south, linking the peoples of the two 
provinces. Tigrayans were dismayed when the Amharan Emperor Menelik signed the Treaty of 
Wichale on May 2, 1889, that recognized Italian sovereignty over Eritrea.15 After years of 
fighting, the forfeiture of the northern province was a stinging defeat for Tigrayans, who viewed 
the emperor’s agreement with the Italians as an indication of the expendability of non-Amharan 
peoples within the framework of the empire. Moreover, the sense of betrayal was heightened by 
the outcome of negotiations after Menelik’s forces defeated the Italians and halted their 
southward advance at the Battle of Adwa in 1896. Instead of using the victory to regain lost 
territories, Menelik continued to recognize Italian control of Eritrea, reinforcing Tigrayan 
mistrust of the center. 
The temporary peace with Italy served to further marginalize Tigrayans at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Having held the Italians at bay, the imperial center began a campaign of 
southern expansion, capturing fertile farmlands that were suitable for coffee production.16 The 
primary benefactors of this expansion were Amharan elites and court favorites, who received 
large estates and thus reinforced their economic dominance. Within the empire’s socio-economic 
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system, the disparity between the Tigrayan and Amharan groups, despite their shared claims to 
imperial authority and preeminence, grew wider as a result of the southern land distributions.  
With expansion-minded colonizers on its northern border, Tigray effectively became a 
buffer zone in the Amharan empire’s protracted struggles to maintain its territorial integrity 
against Egyptian and Italian invaders. Elaborating on Tigray’s suffering as a result of its location 
relative to competing hostile forces, Young writes, 
 Some twenty major battles were fought on Tigrayan soil between the Battle of Adwa and 
 the Italian invasion of 1935. The armies that fought these invaders and various rival 
 Tigrayan factions were primarily made up of peasants who were forced to feed the 
 armies and suffered the depredations of the wars they brought to their lands. With no 
 salaries (until the formation of a professional army in 1941) or even regular food 
 supplies, it was common practice for soldiers to feed themselves at the expense of the 
 peasants whose lands they traversed. Indeed, pillaging from the peasants and collecting 
 war booty were the soldiers’ chief incentives for joining the army.17 
 
Tigray thus sunk into poverty under the burden of such frequent warfare, the effects of which 
were compounded by frequent famines throughout the first quarter of the 20th century. Tigrayans  
were increasingly economically differentiated from the Amharans and more than ever attributed 
their grievances to Shoa, giving rise to the first indications of ethno-nationalist sentiments.18  
 Italian colonial aspirations were reinvigorated as Benito Mussolini’s fascist party came to 
power in 1922, espousing a vision of returning Rome to its former glory.19 Italian activities, 
aiming to undermine the integrity of Haile-Selassie’s empire, would have important 
consequences for the relationship between Tigray and the center. Notably, the Italians’ “Tigrayan 
policy” consisted of a subversive propaganda campaign that specifically played off of regional 
disenchantment with Amhara domination.20 Rome hoped to drive a wedge between the non-
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Amhara peoples and the center and thereby bring about more favorable conditions for its 
impending invasion.  
The Italians invaded Ethiopia by way of Tigray in 1935, ultimately gaining control of 
Shoa and Addis Ababa in 1936. Having been abandoned by Haile-Selassie during the army’s 
early strategic retreats, Tigrayans seriously questioned their allegiance to the center.21 Moreover, 
the investments that followed from Italian colonization proved to be more alluring than the 
economic marginalization Tigrayans had endured previously. Many Tigrayans began to 
acquiesce to and even embrace the colonialists and their modernization projects, such was the 
extent of their disillusionment under the old imperial order. Italian colonization brought with it 
modern amenities, such as hospitals and schools, and infrastructural improvements that had been 
severely lacking. 
After British and Ethiopian resistance forces drove out the Italians in 1941, Haile Selassie 
reclaimed his throne and sought to reconstitute his authority and tax-base through a new program 
of centralization, although he faced stern resistance in Tigray. With bitter memories of Amhara 
domination still fresh in their minds, Tigrayans were reluctant to resubmit to Haile Selassie’s 
order, which was increasingly represented by Amhara bureaucrats, as agents of a governmental 
modernization process, instead of local nobles. “Angered by Haile Selassie’s new 
administration… Tigrayan nobles encouraged peasant resistance and gave it a populist anti-
Shoan character.”22 Regional anger against the returning government’s ethnically skewed 
centralization culminated in a full-fledged rural rebellion, known as the Weyane.23 This uprising 
brought together a diverse set of actors in defiance of the imperial state, such as the 
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“semipastoral communities of southern Tigray,… sectarian nobility,… and highland cultivators,” 
all of which were in some way opposed to the configuration and prospects of renewed Amharan 
rule. 24 
The Weyane uprising ended with Haile Selassie granting concessions to Tigrayan 
interests and was a clear manifestation of the tense center-periphery relationship that 
characterized this region of Ethiopia in the first half of the 20th century. The Weyane prefigures 
the TPLF’s insurgency in that, in both cases, the center alienated regional groups as a result of its 
attempts to increase its ability to intervene in daily life, to advance a form of direct rule. 
Regional frustrations would continue to simmer in the years leading up to the Derg’s 
seizure of power in 1974. But the history of Tigrayan-Shoan relations indicates the difficulty the 
Derg would face in attempting to assimilate the region to its highly centralized framework. 
Given its history, Tigray was largely disillusioned by promises of socialist incorporation under 
another distant government. Decades of marginalization linked Tigrayan identity with central 
oppression and ethno-nationalist sentiments were increasingly vibrant in towns before and after 
the revolution. Such historical grievances would be fundamental to the rallying message 
espoused by the Tigrayan student movement in its mobilization of the peasantry. Before the 
TPLF organized its rural revolt, the disaffected urban military officers of the Derg toppled Haile 
Selassie and seized power, ushering in a socialist government that aspired to centralization far 
beyond that which had occurred under the imperial regime. 
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The Fall of the Imperial Regime 
On top of the center-periphery tensions just discussed, the imperial regime faced the ire 
of an emergent and demanding urban middle-class, whose unrest would provide the impetus for 
the coup that deposed Haile Selassie. While a full account of the coup is beyond the scope of this 
study and not necessary to it, suffice it to say that it was brought on by the imperial regime’s 
inability to respond to the demands for greater political representation, a higher quality of life, 
and secure employment of the urban students, teachers, bureaucrats, laborers, and industrialists, 
many of whom were themselves products of the state’s modernization and centralization 
projects.25 Unrest mounted throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, as the regime responded either 
half-heartedly to reform demands or not at all. As time passed, urban actors were organizing and 
increasingly disaffected with the old order and its lagging adaptation to patterns of 
modernization. It was in this context of middle-class frustration that a group of “about 120 non-
commissioned officers, enlisted soldiers, and radical junior officers with ties to the 
intelligentsia… overthrew the imperial regime in February 1974 and formed the de facto 
government, the Provisional Military Administration Council.”26 Themselves a fraction of the 
angry urban classes, the mid and low-level soldiers of the Derg seized on the political 
opportunity created by burgeoning resentment of the imperial regime.  
With a number of political organizations seeking to upend the traditional order, the 
Derg’s authority was fragile at best in the aftermath of the coup. Diverse nationalist and Marxist 
student groups jockeyed for influence, each envisioning different strategies for engaging the 
military government, yet adding to the confusion. In the midst of the transitional disorder, the 
Derg worked quickly to consolidate its power in both the cities and the countryside. First, it won 
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urban support with its promises of progressive socialism, despite the constant suspicion of the 
radical student groups, which included the TPLF. It then extended its base of support to the rural 
masses by nationalizing land with the Land Proclamation of 4 March 1975. Indicating the 
political expediency of this reform, Young notes that “the agrarian transformation… had as much 
to do with the regime’s survival than any commitment to scientific socialism.”27 Between these 
two strategic appeals, the Derg was able to dispel some of the uncertainty surrounding its claim 
to power and to win the popular legitimacy it needed in the aftermath of the coup. 
Despite ongoing contestation from urban student groups, the Derg set out to construct a 
highly centralized party-state and socialized economic planning throughout Ethiopia. Having 
traced out the relevant history of Tigrayan society and politics and the Derg’s ascent to power, 
we may now begin to consider in greater detail the implications of its land nationalization for the 
rural population, that policy being the basis for a new system of direct rule in the countryside. It 
is direct rule, I will argue, that ultimately transformed peasant politics, raising them up to the 
regional and national levels. 
Nationalization of Land and the Emergence of Rural Unrest 
The nationalization decree remade the political economy of rural Ethiopia, bringing with 
it a more intensive form of direct rule than the one that had evolved incompletely under Haile 
Selassie’s centralization reforms. Where the nascent bureaucracy had to appease traditional 
nobles under the imperial political system,28 the military government aimed to fully eradicate 
remaining vestiges of feudalism and to bring the rural economy under its complete control. 
Nationalization furthermore had significant impacts on the production and livelihoods of the 
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peasantry. Where agricultural modernization would have destabilized the powerbase of the rural 
leaders and therefore the old political order, the Derg set out to accelerate rural economic 
development, adhering to its ideology in the face of the hostility of traditional leaders, yet failing 
to achieve the desired results. It is the interaction between direct rule and the detrimental 
outcomes of the Derg’s statist agriculture that would ultimately stimulate new forms of political 
action in rural Tigray and to which we now turn. I will first discuss the statist land reform, 
analyzing it in relation to the direct rule of rural society. After focusing on nationalization, I will 
then move to collectivization, these two programs being the core elements of direct rule in the 
countryside. I will then provide an overview of the experiences of Tigrayan peasants under the 
statist agricultural system, which initiated their disaffection from and ultimate rebellion against 
the Derg. 
Beginning with nationalization, the Land Proclamation of 1975 recast the socioeconomic 
organization of rural Tigray, sweeping away the hereditary land tenure system and dispossessing 
the Church and the local nobility of their large holdings.29 It declared that “all rural lands shall be 
collective property of the Ethiopian people” and that local Peasant Associations were to 
administer centrally drawn territorial plots.30 Peasant households were to be granted rights over 
the land they worked and the sale or transfer of land was forbidden. Smallholders throughout the 
country hailed these redistributive promises and looked forward to a life free from the grinding 
taxation of their traditional overlords.31  
                                                 
29 Kidane Mengisteab, Ethiopia: The Failure of Land Reform and Agricultural Crisis (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1990), 97. 
30 Dessalegn Rahmato, Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 1985), 37. 
31 Dessalegn Rahmato, “Agrarian Change and Agrarian Crisis: State and Peasantry in Post-Revolution Ethiopia,” 
Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 63, no. 1 (1993), 38. 
74 
 
The nationalization of land and the establishment of the Peasant Associations brought the 
party-state into closer contact with the rural population and gave it a new presence in peasant 
life. The Peasant Associations were “made up of all household heads in each community, and 
they were given authority to redistribute land, maintain common assets, resolve conflicts and 
enable development activities taking place in their areas.”32 While these structures were intended 
“to serve as a form of popular self-administration,” they in reality became local-level extensions 
of the state, falling under the sway of party favorites.33 This cooptation allowed the state to 
penetrate further into daily rural life; the Peasant Associations provided an additional means by 
which the state “[carried] out a variety of political functions, including collecting taxes, 
maintaining law and order, channeling directives to the peasantry, enforcing the… grain 
requisition programmes and later recruiting young men for the military.”34 Using the Peasant 
Associations and the apparatus of rural administration in general, the Derg imposed numerous 
taxes on peasant producers as well as a grain quota to be exchanged for cash via the state’s 
marketing board.35 By many accounts, the various contributions demanded of the peasantry were 
crushing and excessive. 
Direct rule of the countryside thus intensified following nationalization, with the 
structures of statist land administration serving as additional channels of coercion, taxation, and 
intervention. Nationalization “cleared the way for direct access to the peasantry…. The object [of 
which] was to make demands on peasant resources – taxes, ‘contributions,’ food or cash crops, 
free labor… and to prepare peasants for the government’s socialist ventures such as cooperatives, 
                                                 
32 Rahmato, “Agrarian Change and Agrarian Crisis,” 39. 
33 Ibid., 39. 
34 Ibid., 39. 
35 Ibid., 43. 
75 
 
villagization, and resettlement schemes.”36 While the Derg was unable to extend its influence to 
all corners of Tigray, with outlying western regions under the control of rebel movements from 
the early days of the coup onward, it is safe to say that the population in non-rebel areas 
recognized the state as, or at least its intent to be, the authority over land and the rural economy 
generally.37 That the old system of land tenure had been terminated throughout the province38 
indicates that the peasants had acknowledged land would be governed by the central state and its 
agents. The creation of the Peasant Associations and national ownership of land were the first 
and most important extensions of direct rule, which would continue to materialize with 
agricultural collectivization, as well as preparatory resettlement and villagization schemes, in the 
early 1980s. The nationalization reforms paved the way for these high-modernist socialization 
programs, all of which would be based upon the state’s complete control over the allocation of 
land.39 Although they were haphazardly implemented and limited in scope, these programs were 
nonetheless further indications of the state’s willingness to intervene in rural life. 
Collectivized agriculture contrasted sharply with the historic experience of individualized 
peasant production in Tigray. To be sure, Tigrayan peasants were deeply embedded in communal 
bonds but farming was an individual affair, meant to sustain the household and meet the 
taxational obligations it owed to the Church and nobility. Where the traditional system was based 
on self-reliance for subsistence, collectivization aimed to use communal ownership of resources 
for the sake of increased productivity; the means and the ends of the rural economy were to be 
reworked.  
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In addition to administrative challenges related to the coordination of the reforms, such a 
drastic reorganization of economic life entailed cultural friction with a peasantry unaccustomed 
to the mode of agriculture proposed by collectivization. Working against the tide of tradition, the 
Derg began the collectivization process in the late 1970s. While only a small percentage of 
agricultural land was successfully given over to collective farms, doing so nevertheless involved 
a high degree of state intervention and lasting effects on rural communities. The appropriation of 
productive land and the forced resettlement of peasants to work there were requisite measures. 
The peasants who worked on them moreover encountered a mismanaged and restrictive system, 
described in greater detail by Rahmato: 
In the majority of [collective farms], the holdings that were being worked were small in 
relative terms. Each co-operator in Arsi province, for example, often worked less than the 
average individual peasant in the same province. Co-operatives thus did not benefit from 
scale of operations or from more efficient deployment of labor. Moreover the enterprises 
were just as constrained by a shortage of draught animals (their main traction power) as 
individual cultivators. Co-operative labor was organized on a ‘work gang’ basis but the 
gangs were rarely formed on the basis of compatibility, ability or performance. The 
result was less intensive labor, delays in completing necessary tasks, and low output. The 
system of remuneration… was not well received by many peasants because they believed 
it encouraged shirking, incompetence and waste.40 
 
 In light of such conditions, the productive outcomes of the collective farms fell far short of what 
was envisioned for them and, from 1980 to 1988, produced less per hectare on average than 
individually managed farms.41  
In Tigray specifically, the Derg established collective farms in the southern portions of 
the province and relocated peasants to work on them.42 Young notes that “these co-operatives 
were resented by indigenous residents, some of whom were killed by the Derg for resisting them. 
In the event the scheme did not prove successful, apparently because of the difficulty 
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individualistic Tigrayan peasants had in working collectively.”43 Although it was implemented 
only in a portion of Tigray, collectivization served as an indication of the state’s prerogative over 
land and its intent to intervene in peasant life. Whether they worked on a collective farm or had 
merely heard about them, rural populations throughout Tigray became aware of the Derg’s 
presence in their daily affairs in the late 1970s and early 1980s as news of collectivization and 
resettlements circulated. Collectivization thus represented a novel, looming aspect of direct rule 
for rural Tigrayans and Ethiopians in general. Along with nationalization reforms and the activity 
of the Peasant Associations, such manifestations of direct rule of land would, according to the 
hypothesis, drive peasants to target the state and to mobilize in numbers in order resolve 
grievances related to land and, in this more expansive case, the rural economy. 
Although they were initially welcoming of the Derg’s equalizing reforms, Tigrayan 
peasants soon became disaffected with the new system. As noted above, the numerous 
frustrations that arose from direct rule of rural life included crushing taxation, ineffective and 
unfair management of agricultural resources, and authoritarian administration, conditions which 
were exacerbated by famines in the late 1970s and 1980s. The combination of miserable levels of 
productivity and insatiable state demands pushed the peasantry to reject the Derg. Ultimately, 
“the seeds of [the military regime’s] humiliating downfall were sown by its own doctrinaire 
agrarian policies, which led to the hardening of peasant-state relations, and eventually to the 
complete alienation of the peasantry from the regime.”44  
The experience of direct rule, therefore, primed the Tigrayan peasantry for mobilization. 
Using McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly’s interactive framework of mobilization, we can elucidate the 
causal mechanisms of Tigrayan revolt. Firstly, the miserable experience of direct rule, in this 
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case the relevant social change process, caused the peasantry to engage in threat attribution, 
seeing the Derg as an enemy. The disaffection of the rural population thus provided an opening 
for urban-rural brokerage, an opportunity which the established, yet city-centered TPLF used to 
venture into the countryside and mobilize the peasantry for its ethno-nationalist struggle.45 Using 
its organizational resources, the TPLF initiated a process of social appropriation, sending out 
insurgent recruiters to tap into rural social networks and incorporate peasant villages into their 
movement. Feudalism’s residual forms of social integration, comprised of kinship networks, the 
parish community, and the authority of village elders and local notables, were the organizational 
footholds that the TPLF could exploit to mobilize the rural masses. Indeed, brokerage and social 
appropriation fit squarely within the TPLF’s mobilization of the peasantry, in that they are the 
“processes by which well-defined oppositional groups seek to appropriate the routine identities 
and everyday networks of shared fate and trust of previously inactive (or, at best, marginally 
active) social groupings.”46 By way of these processes, beginning with threat attribution as a 
consequence of a grinding system of direct rule and ending with the incorporation of peasants 
into its movement, the TPLF mobilized the hitherto disengaged peasantry. 
With a statist system of rural economic planning in place, Tigrayan peasants came into 
direct contact with the state in their daily lives and felt its demands in the form of taxes and 
quotas. As the central state became the primary authority over peasant livelihoods, the 
hypothetical conditions were set for the emergence of contestation strategies capable of 
challenging state policies and the activation of political identities that transcend ethnic 
boundaries. Having laid out the system of direct rule, the grievances that arose under it, and the 
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mobilization of the rural population, let us now turn to the forms of peasant politics that emerged 
in this context. 
Ethno-Nationalism and Rural Insurrection in Tigray 
I argue here that direct rule of land caused Tigrayan peasant politics, in the forms of 
contestation strategies and political identities, to take on a regional scope in order to challenge 
the national government. I first show that direct rule channeled peasant contestation strategies 
upwards to the regional level, as manifested by the rural insurgency that sought to drive the Derg 
out of Tigray. Throughout that struggle, the political identity adopted by peasant insurgents was 
based on ethno-nationalism and the desire for inclusive self-determination of ethnic groups 
within the Ethiopian political system. Seeing as Tigrayan ethnic identity retained its salience, 
instead of ceding to a regional or national identity that explicitly accommodated multiple 
ethnicities, this outcome diverges to some extent from what the hypothesis predicts of peasant 
political identities under direct rule. These discrepancies between hypothesis and observed 
outcome stem from the historic differential treatment of non-Amhara peoples within the imperial 
system, which reinforced ethnic groups by giving each a unique experience of subjugation. 
Ethnic self-determination within the structure of Ethiopian politics thus became a prominent 
theme for the urban leaders of many of the anti-Derg movements, including the TPLF.47 
Nevertheless, since the TPLF members’ political identity was premised on a notion of self-
determination within a poly-ethnic Ethiopia, we do see an affiliation with the national polity, 
which is more in line with the hypothesis. This section elaborates on these arguments regarding 
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peasant contestation strategies and political identities, first detailing what forms they took and 
then showing how direct rule scaled them upwards to be forces in national politics. 
Having rejected the Derg’s management of rural society, peasants engaged in regionwide 
collective action to challenge the state by supporting the TPLF, usually as militia members, but 
also as informants and logistical aides. This contestation strategy spread across the province and 
the TPLF soon became the dominant anti-Derg movement in Tigray as it gained the backing of 
the rural masses.48 The core of the TPLF’s armed forces consisted of peasants who engaged in 
guerilla warfare, carrying out attacks on central government outposts and skirmishing with the 
Ethiopian military.49 Peasants moreover joined the leadership ranks of the TPLF and enacted 
administrative reforms in areas under the movement’s control, taking on new roles in a 
democratized system of government.50 For example, “the TPLF ensured that their [land reform 
program]… was carried out by the peasants.”51 Other administrative reforms instituted under the 
TPLF included a court system and committees of elected community members focusing on 
social issues such as health and education. Political contestation, in this sense, meant not only 
waging guerilla war but also the creation of a region-specific system of government, in place of 
central control. The peasantry and the TPLF thus implicitly challenged the overall configuration 
of political authority, driving out the Derg’s military and administration and asserting a form of 
self-government across Tigray.52  
Between the armed insurgency and the creation of a new administrative system, such 
direct assertions of regional authority demonstrate the scaling up of peasant politics; peasant 
                                                 
48 Aregawi Berhe, “A Political History of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (1975-1991): Revolt, Ideology, and 
Mobilisation in Ethiopia,” PhD diss. (University of Amsterdam, 2008), 112. 
49 Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and Protest, 220. 
50 Ibid., 218. 
51 Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia, 183. 
52 Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and Protest, 220. 
81 
 
contestation strategies aimed to secure the TPLF’s authority throughout Tigray. What brought 
about this transformation was the structural necessity of replacing the existing form of direct 
rule, which had come to be seen as detrimental to the interests of rural Tigrayans. Young notes 
the causal link between direct rule and scaled-up peasant insurrection that targeted the state, 
writing “the desire to transform both Tigray and its relationship with the state was the 
fundamental reason why the TPLF launched its revolution, but realizing this objective could only 
come about through successfully waging revolutionary war.”53 With the system of authoritarian 
direct rule being the cause of unrest, the resolution of peasant grievances required that political 
action be directed at the institution from which they originated. Where peasant grievances 
stemmed from direct rule by the military government, political action aimed at resolving them 
needed to be of a scale and scope capable of changing the character of that form of government. 
In line with this objective, the rural insurgency struck at the territorial integrity of the Ethiopian 
state and self-government aimed to replace it altogether in Tigray. From the perspective of the 
peasantry, both of these contestation strategies became foreseeably effective in the context of 
grievances produced by direct rule, leading to their adoption. 
As members of the TPLF, peasants adopted rural insurgency and self-government 
because such contestation strategies could reasonably challenge the Derg’s direct rule. In this 
way, the structure of politics delineated the form of political action, causing rural voices and 
aspirations to impact on a national level and forcing their consideration at the highest level of 
government. In March of 1990, the last days of its existence, the Derg attempted to regain 
peasant support by introducing a raft of rural reforms that would relax some of the demands of 
the centralized economy. “The regime was forced to concede [the reforms]… by the escalating 
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anti-government insurgency in the countryside,” now in virtually all rural areas.54 Though the 
response was too late to regain peasant support, the Derg’s concessions and, more importantly, 
its overthrow by a coalition of TPLF-led ethno-nationalist groups in 1991 indicate the extent to 
which peasant rebellion succeeded in challenging the state’s management of the rural economy. 
Turning now to the form of political identity that emerged with the TPLF’s struggle, 
there are important differences between the ethnically-based identity that unified the TPLF and 
the more inclusive ones that the hypothesis predicts will be adopted by rural groups under direct 
rule. Throughout the TPLF’s insurrection, supporters adopted ethno-nationalist political 
identities, that were inspired by a vision of “national self-determination against an oppressive 
state.”55 Tigrayan ethnicity, based on “economic interdependence, common language, religion, 
culture and history,”56 was the unifying force of the movement. Young notes that “The TPLF, a 
movement based on ethnic identity, not surprisingly found its appeal limited when attempting to 
attract support outside its ethnic core.”57 The exclusive nature of this ethnic political identity 
was, however, counterbalanced by the desire for self-determination within the greater Ethiopian 
polity and to “find a lasting space in Ethiopian power politics.”58 That is, the potential for 
cooperation in a reconfigured, ethnically equalized Ethiopia was fundamental to TPLF 
supporters.  
To be sure, the ethnic narrowness of the TPLF’s political identity diverges from the 
predictions of the hypothesis. The explanation for the observed outcomes lies in the nature of the 
Ethiopian political system and its reification of ethnicity, specifically the Tigrayan experience of 
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economic marginalization in the last century of the empire. The Ethiopian state’s historical 
association with Amhara domination, the political source of Tigrayan suffering, made the 
national question of paramount importance to the TPLF. Tigray’s liberation, it was determined, 
could only be achieved with a reorganization of the relationship between the central government 
and the minorities within Ethiopia’s “prison house of nationalities.”59 The ethnic basis of the 
structural imbalance in Ethiopia accentuated the sense of alienation from the national 
government, even with the rise to power of the Derg, which was seen as only another iteration of 
Amhara domination. Moreover, the Derg’s explicitly nationalist rhetoric, exemplified by its 
“Ethiopia First” slogan, discounted that form of political identity,60 despite its potential for 
greater inclusivity and recruitment into the TPLF forces. 
Under these conditions, direct rule of the countryside and the Derg’s attempts to promote 
Ethiopian identity were not capable of defusing the salience of ethnicity. The historical 
experience of marginalization based on ethnicity had given that identity a powerful basis in 
political life and the TPLF understood the suffering of Tigrayans in ethnic terms, as non-
Amharans. Moreover, direct rule by the Derg was continually challenged by the TPLF, limiting 
the extent to which national identities could be consolidated around a relationship with the 
central state. Finally, where the Derg had asserted direct rule, the suffering associated with the 
system of government made nationalism and any rhetorical association with it all the less 
attractive as a political identity.  
Compared with the earlier cases of regionalism observed in Lower Casamance and 
nationalism in Tanzania and Côte d’Ivoire, the ethno-nationalism of the TPLF is a less inclusive 
form of political identity. It is important, however, to acknowledge the TPLF’s attachment to 
                                                 
59 Berhe, “Tigray People’s Liberation Front,” 580. 
60 Ibid., 588. 
84 
 
Ethiopian cohesion, demonstrated by the desire for self-determination within the territory of the 
existing state. This attachment conforms to the hypothesis’ predictions, in that it represents a 
broadening of political identity, albeit a minor one, seeing as the TPLF aimed to rework the 
relationship between Tigray and the central state and ultimately to maintain it. 61 If this aspect of 
the observed political identity conforms to the hypothesis’ predictions, in what way did direct 
rule produce this outcome? The answer stems from the strategic conditions of the rebellions 
produced under the Derg’s system of government. Having alienated numerous other ethnic 
groups and their associated rebel movements through the system of direct rule, with its 
convoluted economic organization and heavy taxational burdens, the Derg made itself the target 
of a collection of aggrieved minorities. Sharing a desire to overturn the central government, yet 
only capable of doing so in conjunction, the various ethnic rebellions found ethno-nationalism to 
be a politically advantageous strategy.62 As the struggle against the Derg progressed, the TPLF 
sought to further articulate its vision of ethnic federalism, which the TPLF leaders could use to 
their strategic advantage in leading and/or joining forces with other ethnic movements.63 Though 
direct rule under both Haile Selassie and the Derg proved to be catastrophic for Tigrayans, a 
federalized version of it was enticing for the TPLF and shaped its rhetoric, demonstrated by the 
sense of belonging to the Ethiopian polity that characterized the group’s political identity. Direct 
rule thus influenced Tigrayan ethno-nationalism to the extent that political identity was derived 
from the strategic conditions that emerged as a result of that system of government. In other 
words, direct rule united the disparate fronts by giving them a shared enemy and thereby 
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influenced the calculations of their leaders regarding the long term effectiveness of an ethno-
nationalism that promised cohesion amongst the ethnicities.  
In the latter stages of the rebellion against the Derg, Tareke commented, “Now that the 
TPLF has moved from the regional to the national terrain, criticizing its initial actions as 
manifestations of ‘narrow nationalist deviations,’…. The front will have to repoliticize ethnicity 
for purposes of national unity.”64 Ultimately, the TPLF led the coalition that ultimately 
overthrew the military government, known as the Ethiopian People’s Democratic Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF), and, in doing so, laid the foundation for ethnic federalism in 
contemporary Ethiopia. To this day, the ethno-national basis of political identity, as well as the 
TPLF’s rural mobilization are of great importance to contemporary Ethiopian politics, having 
become aspects of state tradition.65 
Conclusion: Comparing the Effect of Hierarchy on Peasant Politics 
After outlining the history of Tigrayan agricultural society and the region’s relations with 
the successive central governments, this chapter argued that direct rule caused rural Tigrayans to 
engage in scaled-up contestation strategies that impacted on the highest levels of Ethiopian 
politics. Peasant participation in those strategies, which were armed insurgency and self-
administration, was facilitated by the TPLF. This urban group mobilized the peasantry by 
exploiting the brokerage opportunity created by rural alienation from the military government 
and its statist agriculture. While the outcomes for peasant contestation strategies corresponded to 
the hypothesis’ predictions, the ethno-national political identity that initially unified the TPLF’s 
movement diverged from them. The movement’s emphasis on Tigrayan ethnicity was rooted in 
Ethiopia’s imperial system, whose structural inequalities put regional groups in tension with the 
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Amhara leadership and central government. Nationalism, at this point associated with a new 
iteration of centralized domination, was not a relevant political identity and the experience of 
common oppression associated with the ethnic group gave narrower ethno-nationalism a greater 
motivating capacity. As the TPLF expanded beyond its regional base, the strategic benefits of 
emphasizing self-determination within the Ethiopian polity led to the modification of the 
movement’s political identity, so as to create cohesion amongst the various other ethnic 
rebellions in their attempt to overthrow the Derg. Direct rule led to the broadening of political 
identities in that it provided a common enemy that the TPLF and other ethnic movements 
toppled, under the unified banner of the EPRDF. 
Considering the conditions that produced these outcomes, the variable of hierarchy, 
which hitherto has not been discussed in this chapter, must not be discounted, yet its effect is 
only now apparent. Comparing the groundnut basin and Tigray province, cases of feudal 
societies which responded differently to the presence of central state authority, reveals that 
mobilization of hierarchical groups depends on the degree of those groups’ incorporation or 
marginalization within the state’s political order. Up until this case study, hierarchy was closely 
correlated with incorporation, regional bargaining power, and constraints on state penetration. 
Given the unique history of Ethiopian state-building, which differed from the experiences of the 
former colonies of French West Africa, these associations did not hold up. Where the experience 
of oppression within the imperial political order conditioned the rebellion in hierarchical Tigray, 
the marabout elites of the groundnut basin came to an agreement with the Senegalese socialist 
party in order to maintain their interests. In these two cases, mobilization depended on the 
hierarchy’s level of incorporation into the central state’s political framework. Seeing little hope 
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of advancement under yet another distant government, Tigrayan actors engaged in collective 
action to challenge the Ethiopian state.  
Moreover, Tigrayan hierarchy influenced the political identity adopted by the TPLF. As 
hierarchy brought with it socio-cultural reproduction, it in turn provided an array symbols, 
memories, and traditions, that served as resources for an ethno-national political identity.66 
Similarly, the vertical integration referred to by Markakis solidified the bonds of the Tigrayan 
ethnicity and reinforced group members’ sense of belonging to it. Through cultural and social 
connections, hierarchy bolstered the salience of ethnicity and gave it political force for the TPLF, 
leading to its adoption of ethno-nationalism. To recalibrate the hypothesis to match this outcome, 
it should predict unincorporated, hierarchical groups to adopt somewhat more exclusive political 
identities, which adhere to the culture and social bonds of the group. These, it should be 
remembered, will remain flexible as contestation spreads and makes narrower identities less 
palpable for disparate groups, as observed in the TPLF’s emphasis on self-determination and 
cooperation amongst the oppressed nationalities.
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
This study was inspired by a desire to understand the emergence of broad-based peasant 
movements in Africa. In seeking to understand under what conditions small farmers collectively 
challenge state power, in a direct way that goes beyond the “second best” tactics of evasion and 
passive resistance, I hoped to shed light on an aspect of peasant politics that had not been 
covered by the voluminous accounts of exploitation, dispossession, and urban-bias. Over the 
course of this work, I honed in on the structure of rural societies and state intervention in land 
and agriculture as the critical variables in explaining where nationally significant peasant 
movements emerge. As demonstrated by the case studies of the groundnut basin and Lower 
Casamance in Senegal and the cocoa frontier of Côte d’Ivoire, state penetration could be loosely 
gauged by the political strength of the rural society it encountered. In Lower Casamance and in 
the forest region of Côte d’Ivoire, nascent states managed land and agriculture with minimal 
initial resistance from the fragmented, acephalous societies of these areas. The marabout leaders 
of the groundnut basin, on the other hand, were able to use their political and economic weight to 
curtail the state’s influence and to constrain its autonomy. While this formula for state 
penetration applied to the post-colonial nations of Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, it did not explain 
the case for Tigray in Ethiopia, where the hierarchical society clashed with, instead of allying 
with, the central state. We traced this outlying case to the specific history of Ethiopian state-
building, in which dynastic politics and an imperial system severely undermined the potential for 
cooperation between the Tigrayan periphery and the Amhara center.  
Bearing in mind the outlier case of Tigray, the understanding of state penetration based 
on social structures told us where the state is likely to come into close contact with rural 
populations and become a principal authority over peasant livelihoods. By tracking state 
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penetration according to group social structure, we could more methodically predict the location 
of statist institutions, the other key variable in explaining where strong peasant movements take 
hold. Working from Boone’s theory regarding the effects of statist institutions on peasant 
politics, such institutions seemed likely to bring peasant movements into high-level political 
arenas, all while grouping together diverse ethnicities. Statist rural institutions in theory would 
shape peasant political activity to the specific form that the study sought to understand.  
Where statist systems were fully articulated, and once conditions for mobilization were 
met, peasant contestation took on the scope to challenge modern states. Indeed, in all of the cases 
of scaled-up contestation, the movements elicited responses from central authorities. If the 
outcomes for contestation strategies were fairly uniform, with peasant actors making claims on a 
level that corresponded to the authority they targeted, there was slightly more variation in 
outcomes for peasant political identities across cases. In Lower Casamance and in Côte d’Ivoire, 
diverse ethnicities were grouped together in making claims on the state, but in the latter case 
ethnic identity still had some relevance, given the influence of ethnic authorities in the semi-
statist system. In Tigray, the early stages of the TPLF’s movement emphasized ethnic identity, 
although the tactical demands of challenging a centralized state caused diverse ethnicities to 
come together; the practical conditions of politics under a system of direct rule eventually 
outweighed the ideological significance of ethnicity. Regarding the character of peasant political 
identity, the degree of traditional authority in the mobilized society largely determined the 
importance of narrower identities. In the acephalous area of Lower Casamance, which 
encountered a fully statist system, the MFDC did not valorize ethnic belonging; as mentioned 
above, the electoral struggles on the cocoa frontier saw the mixing of ethnic and national 
identities, in conjunction with a mixture of statist and traditional tenure systems; in Tigray, the 
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cultural specificity and sense of ethnic pride that stemmed from a rigid organization of society 
made ethno-nationalism a powerful force for the TPLF, at least in the initial stages of the 
movement.  
Given the outcomes for political identity and contestation, a predictive framework for 
scaled-up, broad-based peasant movements must reserve space for close analyses of the balance 
of traditional and state power in rural regions. In understanding the pull of these opposing forces, 
the analyst, I believe, can gauge the extent to which peasant movements will be ethnically 
inclusive and geared towards challenging regional or national authorities. At the same time, such 
analyses need not start from scratch. The framework I presented, in which the centralization of 
regional societies is used to roughly measure the penetration of statist land and agricultural 
systems, lays the groundwork for predictions and explanations of vibrant peasant movements. 
Moreover, it was confirmed by the post-colonial case studies and helped to orient the explanation 
of the unique outcomes in Tigray. 
Turning now to future research prospects, the framework could be further developed by 
incorporating a geographical and ecological analysis of state-building. What types of terrain and 
agriculture are accessible for states? Where is it easiest to escape from centralized authorities? 
An understanding of the environmental conditions that restrict or facilitate state penetration and 
control of populations could be used to extend the predictive scope of the framework. 
Environmental factors certainly impact on the rural centralization variable, so they are therefore 
meaningful to the explanatory depth of the theory. Additionally, it would be useful to analyze the 
cultural and ideological aversion of decentralized groups to state power. What is the moral value 
of remaining in an acephalous system, to those who belong to them? How do these convictions 
motivate and inform resistance to central authorities? A closer analysis of the mentality of the 
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Diola and indigenous cocoa frontier populations could greatly augment the understanding of 
center-periphery relations and peasant politics in those cases. 
Finally, there is considerable need for contemporary analyses of the emerging peasant 
movements, which, I believe, can be complemented by the theories laid out here. A number of 
African states have in recent years facilitated land sales to corporate entities and the creation of 
private agro-industrial development projects; such trends reflect the type of state interventions 
that should cause peasant movements to rise to a national scale. While structural adjustment 
reined in states’ capacity to intervene in the rural economy, centralized private actors have in 
many cases filled some of the void left by the retrenchment of centralized public actors. Just as 
peasants were seen responding to statist management, a similar trend is unfolding today as broad 
rural movements advocate for their members’ rights in the face of massive land grabs.1 Peasant 
movements are calling on states to protect small farmers, at risk of dispossession as larger actors 
seek access to land. Moreover, the juxtaposition of foreign agro-industrial corporations with a 
disempowered peasantry has the potential to incite a nationalism claiming the right to the state’s 
protection from outside interests. Finally, global warming and soaring populations will continue 
to put pressure on rural resources, heightening the possibility for contention and conflict. African 
politics will be shaped by these trends; analysts, policymakers, and advocates that are equipped 
to understand the emergence of peasant contention will be better positioned to respond to its 
effects. In any case, the findings presented here indicate that peasant political action must not be 
discounted even when it targets much larger actors. The processes leading to such contention and 
the responses it produced are, I believe, grounds for a cautious optimism in the future of the 
newly emerging peasant movements.
                                                 
1 See Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros, eds., Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of Rural Movements in Africa, Asia, 
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